CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

2019-2021
Safety and Security Focus Area
Work Programme
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Safety and Security Focus Areas

The safety performance of the civil aviation system is variable. It ranges from excellent in the large aircraft (airline) sector to quite poor in the commercial helicopter and private recreational aviation areas. The helicopter sector is of particular concern given the growth of the sector in recent years and the use of the aircraft in the burgeoning tourism industry.

To improve the overall safety performance of the New Zealand aviation system, the Authority has identified eight safety and security focus areas, based on analysis of safety data, sector based intelligence and international trends and research. The focus areas are a tactical lens to look through to ensure the Authority achieves the right priorities.

The dynamic nature of aviation requires the Authority to be agile and resilient. As we intervene in the system, the behaviours of those within it, and the issues giving rise to safety concerns, will change. The Authority therefore reviews these focus areas regularly, and they are likely to change throughout the life of the Authority’s 2019 – 2024 Statement of Intent.
The safety and security focus areas are categorised as:

- **Critical** – there is immediate risk to people’s safety and wellbeing; and active work programme is in operation that is prioritised over other work.

  **The helicopter sector**
  The helicopter sector has a higher accident rate than other aviation sectors, which has the potential to damage New Zealand’s reputation for having safe and secure skies, as well as incurring unnecessary social costs.

- **Active management** – there is high potential risk; an active work programme is in operation.

  **Airborne conflicts**
  Airborne Conflicts between aircraft have the potential to lead to mid-air collisions and resulting fatalities.

  **Security threat levels and responses**
  The aviation security environment is constantly dynamic with the potential for high levels of ambiguity. In the event of a potential, emerging, or actual aviation security crisis, timely and coordinated decision making and operational responses are required to ensure the New Zealand aviation system remains safe and secure.

  **International air cargo security**
  The security of the international air transport system and the continued facilitated flow of high value export cargo by air to international markets depends on the continued existence of a robust and trusted air cargo security system.

  **Smart Security**
  Thinking smarter to improve security outcomes, enhanced passenger facilitation and optimised utilisation of equipment and staff.

- **Monitoring / maintained** – we are monitoring activities and the impacts of previous work programmes.

  **Loss of control in flight**
  Where an aircraft loses control in flight due to human, mechanical or other reasons, leading to serious harm incidents/accidents.

  **Runway excursions**
  Where an aircraft departs the runway unexpectedly, a critical phase of flight, with a high risk of serious harm.

  **Queenstown operations**
  Queenstown is an important tourist destination and aviation plays an important part in the “Queenstown experience”. There is a need to ensure the various flying activities are conducted safely.

**Detail of each of the focus areas**
Each focus area describes a set of issues that give rise to safety or security risks that the Authority believes need to be mitigated in order to improve the performance of the civil aviation system. Detail is provided below, with a description of the risk, the impact on the system and stakeholders, the benefits resulting from this work and the approach we are taking.
## The Helicopter Sector - The helicopter sector has a higher accident rate than other aviation sectors, which has the potential to damage New Zealand's reputation for having safe and secure skies, as well as incurring unnecessary social costs.

### STATUS: Critical

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<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Intended impacts on the system</th>
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</table>
| Fatal and serious injury helicopter accidents, particularly in the air transport operations, have the potential to damage New Zealand’s reputation for safe and secure skies, as well as incurring unnecessary social cost. | Helicopters are an important part of aviation activity in New Zealand and are used in a variety of roles – from agriculture, to tourism and emergency services. Of late there has been a concerning number of fatal and serious injury accidents, particularly in air transport operations. The purpose of this focus area is to ensure safety risks are managed effectively by aviation participants with strong leadership, co-ordination and oversight by the Authority, and that accident rates are lowered so they align with, or are better than, international comparisons. | Safety risks are managed effectively by aviation participants with strong leadership, coordination and oversight by the Authority  
Heightened level of engagement on key safety risks identified and closer scrutiny through regulatory activity targeting those risks  
Improved NZ helicopter accident rates so they align with, or improve on, international comparisons.  | All helicopter operators in New Zealand – commercial and private  
Organisations who represent helicopter operators  
Organisations and individuals who provide services to helicopter operations  
Organisations and individuals who use helicopter services. |

### Profile of targeted Authority approach

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| Develop and sign a Memorandum of Understanding between the Authority, Aviation NZ and the NZ Air Line Pilots’ Association for collaboration to improve the safety performance of the helicopter sector (if not signed prior to 30 June 2019). Under the above MOU:  
  - Develop a strategy (nominally to cover a five-year period).  
  - Agree on and execute action plans. Notwithstanding that the below actions may be included as an integrated approach under the action plans developed from the Strategy:  
  - Develop the capacity of the Authority to conduct oversight of helicopter operators:  
    o Develop and conduct training required to conduct monitoring and inspection [surveillance] under a performance-based regulatory environment  
    o Ensure units assigned to oversight activity are fully staffed with competent inspectors as determined by RCP initiatives  
  - Continue to certificate operators under Civil Aviation Rule (CAR) Part 100 Safety Management (SMS is present and suitable) in accordance with approved implementation dates  
  - Commence routine surveillance under a performance-based environment (Safety Management System is operating and effective)  
  - Focus health and safety assessments on helicopter operations to ascertain compliance with the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO).  
  - Continue implementation of Part 135 Sector Risk Profile controls allocated to the Authority. | Continue collaboration and initiatives developed under the MOU between the Authority, Aviation NZ and the NZ Air Line Pilots’ Association to improve the safety performance of the helicopter sector.  
Continue certification of operators under CAR Part 100 Safety Management to ensure all operators are certificated by 1 February 2021 as required by CARs. |
**Airborne Conflicts** - Airborne Conflicts between aircraft have the potential to lead to mid-air collisions and resulting fatalities.

**STATUS:** Active Management

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| There is a risk that any airborne conflict safety interventions not informed by a full understanding of contributing factors will not target and address underlying causes. This has the potential to result in ineffective interventions on the part of the CAA resulting in significant aviation and public safety risks remaining untreated and increasing the potential for fatalities to occur. | The purpose of this focus area is to ensure we are doing the right things in the right way to mitigate the potential risks associated with Airborne Conflicts. Our work will seek to identify the full range of potential contributing factors, dynamic variables, and controls influencing the occurrence of Airborne Conflicts. This identification will support development by the Authority of an over-arching mitigation strategy and ensure targeted interventions are appropriate and relevant to contributing factors such as:  
  - airspace and aerodrome circuit procedure management;  
  - airspace and aerodrome circuit procedure design; and  
  - loss of situational awareness by pilots.  
Given the wide range of potential contributing factors involved, this focus area requires a multidisciplinary approach aimed at developing more effective regulatory interventions in support of overall safety improvement. | • Increased domain awareness of airspace risk by CAA  
• Increased awareness of airborne conflict related risks by affected stakeholders  
• Improved stakeholder engagement in airborne conflict and airspace issues  
• Improved engagement in local airspace safety management by aerodrome user groups  
• Reduction in the rate of critical and major airspace occurrences over time. | • Parts 102, 115, 121, 125 and 135 Aircraft Operators  
• Certificated and Uncertificated Flight Training Organisations  
• Private and Recreational sector peak bodies  
• Certificated and Uncertificated Aerodromes  
• Airways Corporation  
• Local Government in cases where its decision making roles influence airspace safety matters  
• Department of Conservation where its decision making roles influence airspace usage trends. |

**Profile of targeted Authority approach**

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<td>Ongoing deliberate interventions to target the identified airborne conflicts risk. That action may be led by the Authority, or by industry participants, or as a partnership approach- coupled with ongoing monitoring, and where required, strategy implementation adjustment.</td>
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Benefits

The successful management of Airborne Conflicts will deliver the following benefits to the Civil Aviation environment outlined below:

• The CAA intervenes in respect of potential airborne conflicts in the right way, at the right place and at the right time to suppress risk. Focused, targeted interventions become the norm;  
• Aviation participants act safely and actively manage risks (with appropriate CAA support); and  
• A safe airspace environment is maintained for all aviation activities.
Security Threat Levels & Responses - The aviation security environment is constantly dynamic with the potential for high levels of ambiguity. In the event of a potential, emerging, or actual aviation security crisis, timely and coordinated decision making and operational responses are required to ensure the New Zealand aviation system remains safe and secure.

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| The dynamic nature of the domestic and international security environment demands an aviation security system that is agile and able to continue to respond to changes in threat levels in a focused, timely and coordinated manner. In the event of an aviation security crisis, the failure to maintain timely and coordinated decision making processes and the ability to implement additional security controls in a timely and effective manner would adversely impact on the quality of overall system responses with resulting negative consequences for public safety. | To maintain timely and effective coordination with, and involvement in, wider All of Government crisis assessment and decision making processes and the timely promulgation of any additional aviation security requirements considered necessary. To maintain capability to respond to changes in threat levels and implement any aviation security contingency measures in a timely and effective manner. | • Aviation security technologies and systems are appropriate to respond to dynamic security threats.  
  • Continued assurance as to:  
    ❖ The effectiveness of the Authority's involvement in the relevant All of Government assessment and decision making processes; and  
    ❖ The ability of the Authority to support timely promulgation and implementation by responsible parties of additional aviation security requirements across the aviation arising from relevant decision making processes. | • Stakeholders involved in the assessment and decision making process in the event of potential, emerging or actual aviation security crisis. |

Benefits
A safe and secure airline sector within which ongoing operations are impacted to the minimum level appropriate by any potential, emerging or actual aviation security crisis.

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| • Active incorporation into Authority processes and approaches of any learnings arising from both Authority specific and wider the All of Government responses to the 15 March 2019 Christchurch mosque attacks  
  • Continued active Authority involvement in All of Government security coordination processes including any national exercises | • Ongoing active management and continuous improvement of Authority processes and approaches  
  • Continued active Authority involvement in All of Government security coordination processes including any national exercises |
### International Air Cargo Security

The security of the international air transport system and the continued facilitated flow of high value export cargo by air to international markets depends on the continued existence of a robust and trusted air cargo security system.

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| The absence of a robust and trusted international air cargo security system will impact negatively on the security of international aviation operations from New Zealand and New Zealand’s international reputation. It will also impact on the continued facilitated flow of high value air cargo from New Zealand to international markets with the resulting potential for adverse economic consequences for New Zealand exporters. | The continued existence of a robust and trusted international air cargo supply chain system is essential for both safety and economic reasons. At present New Zealand’s cargo security system is robust and trusted by our international aviation security partners. This allows the safe and facilitated flow of high value export air cargo to overseas markers. It is vital this continues to be the case. The International Air Cargo Security focus area will support informed and targeted intervention activity to sustain levels of compliance throughout the system and retain stakeholder assurance as to the level of security applied to air cargo carried on flights from New Zealand. | • Informed and targeted intervention activity  
• Continued facilitated air cargo flow to export markers via the presence of high levels of confidence in the effectiveness of NZ’s international air cargo security system. | • Regulated Air Cargo Agents (RACAs) and airlines under Civil Aviation Rule Part 109 (Regulated Air Cargo Agent – Certification) and 108 (Air Operator Security Programme). |

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| Focus area closure and move to long term monitoring via surveillance and certification activity and the results of international partner's independent review of New Zealand’s international air cargo security system | Benefits: The successful completion of this work will deliver the following benefits to the Civil Aviation environment:  
• Safety and Security: the continued effective management of the security risks to flights from New Zealand arising from the carriage of air cargo  
• Economic: The continued facilitated flow of air cargo from New Zealand to international export markets. |
### Smart Security/Future 2022 – Thinking smarter to improve security outcomes, enhanced passenger facilitation and optimized utilisation of equipment and staff

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| To avoid exponential cost increases being required to respond to evolving threats and increasing passenger numbers, there needs to be a greater focus on how new processes, systems and technologies can be utilised to deliver security services more efficiently and effectively. | To be well-informed, agile thinkers, capable of evaluating options in response to changing situations. To build resilience in our current system and make developments to meet future demands. | • A move to a security outcome focused approach to Avsec’s operations  
• A move to a national system based approach to Avsec security delivery  
• The ability to undertake differentiated screening, based against varying threat/levels enabling more appropriate security responses to changing circumstances  
• Greater integration and collaboration between the security function and other border/security/intelligence functions, leading to increased security outcomes and easier and more efficient passage through the border  
• Fit for purpose infrastructure  
• Avsec remain contemporary with appropriate international standards, e.g. ECAC Standard 3 for HBS. | • Airlines  
• Airport owners and operators  
• NZ Police  
• Immigration New Zealand (MBIE)  
• New Zealand Customs Service  
• Ministry of Primary Industries  
• Office of Transport Security  
• Transportation Security Administration  
• Travelling public  
• New Zealand businesses reliant on the import / export of products by air. |

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| • Avsec triennial funding review (includes major initiatives comes into effect 1 July 2019).  
• Screening Advancement and Modernisation (Smart lanes, AIT, CCTV, Walk Through Metal Detector upgrades, common image processing).  
• New workforce operating model implemented.  
• Definition of risk based/differentiated screening in New Zealand context developed.  
• Progressive implementation of digital mobility / Digitization and the Paperless Frontline.  
• Staff growth to match requirements - 235 FTE.  
• Non passenger screening implementation aligned to exposition changes.  
• Border sector transit passenger (I 2 I) initiatives developed including better information sharing. | • Year 2 of funding review.  
• Major role out of Hold Baggage Screening.  
• Completion of SMART lane roll out. |
Loss of control in Flight - Where an aircraft loses control in flight due to human, mechanical or other reasons, leading to serious harm incidents/accidents.

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| There are multiple reasons for loss of control in flight and often accidents in this area are complex and a result of multiple factors. These can be categorised under three main causal categories, technical; non-technical (human factors) and environmental. | The purpose of this focus area is to ensure that aviation participants have considered the risk of loss of control in flight as part of their safety management system. The objective is safe and effective aircraft flight path management. Flight path management is the planning, execution, and assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft. This initiative is intended to increase participant and regulator awareness of the elements of good flight path management, including controls to manage the risk of flight path deviations, aircraft upset, and loss of control in flight. | • Sector participants will have a greater awareness of the risk associated with loss of control in flight in the context of their operations  
• Sector participants will have a greater understanding of the causal factors and demonstrate effective mitigation of risk  
• Industry will have access to a range of Authority-led outreach activities  
• Aviation operators demonstrate risk mitigation associated with loss of control in flight following heightened oversight by the Authority through surveillance and activities  
• Participants are effectively managing the risks, with loss of control in flight included as part of operators’ Safety Management System  
• Sustained reduction in the frequency of pre-cursor events that have the potential to create loss of control in flight  
• Increased confidence that operators are appropriately managing the risk of loss of control in flight. | New Zealand and international participants in the following aviation sectors:  
- Fixed wing Civil Aviation Rule (CAR) Part 121 (Air Operations – Large Aeroplanes)  
- CAR Part 125 (Air Operations – Medium Aeroplanes)  
- CAR Part 135 (Air Operations – Helicopters and Small Aeroplanes)  
- CAR Part 129 (Foreign Air Transport Operator – Certification)  
- Australian operators with ANZA privileges. |

Benefits

Participants in this sector will be better informed about safety risks affecting their operation and treatments for those risks - this information can be included in their SMS. The CAA will be better informed of safety risks affecting operators in this sector and those organisations which support these operations, and can assign resources to addressing these risks. The result will a reduction in flight path deviation and aircraft upset occurrences, and no loss of control in flight events.

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| • CAA promotion of the Sector Risk Profile (SRP) and associated resources, to encourage participant adoption of relevant risks and risk controls (including LOC-I) as part of their SMS.  
• CAA surveillance and certification activity includes assessment of operator management of LOC-I risk.  
• Enable the implementation of operator safety initiatives such as Threat and Error Management (TEM), Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT), and Evidence Based Training (EBT) to prevent or mitigate LOC-I  
• Provision of guidance material/resources and safety promotion on topics related to LOC-I risk management (e.g. UPRT)  
• Liaison and participation with CASA on UPRT training for industry and development of their Flight Standards Guidance.  
• Provision of onsite LOC-I prevention advice during industry flight testing.  
• On-going analysis of safety occurrences and other safety data to identify emerging LOC-I risk factors (reported events that contain precursors to LOC-I are prioritised for response)  
• On-going safety investigation (including oversight of operator safety investigations) regarding LOC-I occurrences or pre-cursor events  
• Close cooperation with Meteorological Service Providers to enable the safe introduction of new weather forecasting products (e.g. turbulence, icing, volcanic ash, lightning) |
Runway Excursions - Where an aircraft departs the runway unexpectedly, a critical phase of flight, with a high risk of serious harm.

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<td>Many factors contribute to runway excursions including weather, aerodrome/ runway design, runway condition, aircraft technical, aircraft performance, operator procedures, instrument procedures, crew handling or errors etc. Given the wide range of factors, this focus area requires a multidisciplinary approach.</td>
<td>The purpose of this focus area is to ensure that participants have considered the risk of runway excursion as part of their safety management system. The objective is safe runway operations through effective aircraft flight path guidance and control. This initiative is intended to reduce the frequency of runway excursion occurrences and to minimise the impact of those events. This will be achieved through increased industry and regulator awareness of the elements of safe runway operations, including training, aircraft performance, procedures, and infrastructure elements and attention to related controls.</td>
<td>Sector participants will have a greater awareness of the risk, a greater understanding of the casual factors and start to become more effective at mitigating those risks</td>
<td>New Zealand and international participants in the following aviation sectors:</td>
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<td>• Industry will have access to a range of Authority-led outreach activities</td>
<td>• Fixed wing Civil Aviation Rule (CAR) Part 121 (Air Operations – Large Aeroplanes)</td>
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<td>• Aviation operators demonstrate risk mitigation associated with runway excursions following heightened oversight by the Authority through surveillance and activities</td>
<td>• CAR Part 125 (Air Operations – Medium Aeroplanes)</td>
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<td>• Participants demonstrate effective management of risks associated with runway excursions included as part of operators’ Safety Management System</td>
<td>• CAR Part 135(Air Operations – Helicopters and Small Aeroplanes)</td>
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<td>• The number of accidents relating to runway excursions risk is trending downwards, resulting in an increase in the travelling public’s confidence in the safety of the aviation system.</td>
<td>• CAR Part 129 (Foreign Air Transport Operator – Certification)</td>
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<td>• CAA promotion of the Sector Risk Profile (SRP) and associated resources, to encourage participant adoption of relevant risks and risk controls (including RE) as part of their SMS.</td>
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<td>• CAA surveillance and certification activity includes assessment of participant (operator, aerodrome operator, ATC) management of RE risk.</td>
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</tr>
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<td>• Continued promotion of Runway Safety Teams.</td>
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<td>• Contribution to the National Runway Safety Group (CAA, Airports Assoc, Airways, NZALPA, WLG Airport).</td>
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<td>• Enable the implementation of operator safety initiatives such as TALPA (Take-off and Landing Performance Assessment), Threat and Error Management (TEM), and Evidence Based Training (EBT) to prevent or mitigate RE.</td>
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<td>• On-going policy development regarding ‘real time runway condition reporting’ and promoting adoption by participants.</td>
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<td>• Enabling the safe expansion of PBN, including instrument flight procedures with vertical guidance.</td>
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<td>• Provision of guidance material/resources and safety promotion on topics related to RE management (e.g. FSF Go Around Decision making; IATA Runway Excursions Risk Reduction Toolkit, etc.).</td>
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<td>• On-going analysis of safety occurrences and other safety data to identify emerging RE risk factors (reported events that contain precursors to RE are prioritised for response).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• On-going safety investigation (including oversight of operator safety investigations) regarding RE occurrences or pre-cursor events.</td>
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<td>• Close cooperation with Meteorological Service Providers to enable the safe introduction of new weather products (e.g. wind shear, automated aerodrome weather forecasts).</td>
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Queenstown Operations - Queenstown is an important tourist destination and aviation plays an important part in the “Queenstown experience”. There is a need to ensure the various flying activities are conducted safely.

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| Aviation accidents in the Queenstown area have the potential to damage New Zealand’s reputation for safe and secure skies, and as a tourist destination, as well as incurring unnecessary social cost. | Queenstown is vital in terms of the region’s economy and more broadly New Zealand’s reputation as a tourist destination. The purpose of this focus area is to ensure the flying activity conducted in the Queenstown region, which is unique in its terrain, weather, and variety of flying, are conducted safely so as to provide the public with a high level of confidence that they feel and are safe. | • Safety risks are managed effectively by aviation participants with strong leadership, coordination and oversight by the Authority  
• Heightened level of engagement on key safety risks identified and closer scrutiny through regulatory activity targeting those risks. | New Zealand and international participants in the following aviation sectors:  
• Participants who conduct airside flight and ground operations activity at ZQN  
• Participants who conduct aviation activity within the Queenstown area  
• Organisations and individuals who provide support services to flying operations in Queenstown  
• Organisations and individuals who use aviation services in Queenstown. |

Benefits

The successful management of Queenstown will deliver the following benefits to the Civil Aviation environment of:

• No accidents associated with Queenstown operations.

Profile of targeted Authority approach

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| Monitor operations at Queenstown:  
• Surveillance and certification activity used to assess operator effectiveness in managing risk.  
• Attendance at the Queenstown and Milford User Group (QMUG) meetings to assess Group effectiveness in managing risk.  
• Analysis of safety data to ensure no new risks emerge. | Regular reviews of risks and safety data conducted through the Regulatory SMS, with appropriate regulatory action taken as necessary. |