

## Advisory Circular AC139-18

#### **Aerodrome Security**

Revision 0 XX XXXX 2025

#### General

Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Advisory Circulars (ACs) contain information about standards, practices, and procedures that the Director has found to be an **acceptable means of compliance** with the associated rule.

Consideration will be given to other methods of compliance that may be presented to the Director. When new standards, practices, or procedures are found to be acceptable they will be added to the appropriate AC.

#### Purpose

This AC describes an acceptable means of compliance with sections of Civil Aviation Rule Part 139, *Aerodromes Certification – Operations and Use*, relating to security measures for aerodromes. It is intended for applicants and/or holders of:

- a security-designated aerodrome operator certificate, and/ or
- a non-security designated aerodrome operator certificate.

Operators of qualifying or non-certificated aerodromes could also refer to the sections on security advice, for advice on security measures that could benefit their aerodrome.

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#### **Related Rules**

This AC relates to Part 139 – specifically Subpart D, *Aerodrome Security*, regarding aerodrome security.

#### **Change Notice**

This is the initial issue of this AC.

#### **Version History**

**History Log** 

Revision No	Effective date	Summary of changes
0	XX XXXX 2025	Initial issue.

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## **1.Introduction**

**1.1** This AC contains guidance on Part 139 requirements for aerodrome security. It is intended for certificated aerodrome operators, but non-certificated aerodrome operators can also use the material as a guide to security measures they could implement. No matter how large or busy an aerodrome is, they all have a similar obligation, that is to: prevent crimes against the <u>Aviation Crimes Act 1972</u>, and protect persons and property from dangers arising from such crimes.

**1.2** An aerodrome operator needs to create and maintain a safe and secure aerodrome environment by setting up safety and security programmes. While the aerodrome operator has this overarching responsibility, additional responsibilities for specific tasks may be shared between aerodrome operators or aviation security service providers<sup>1</sup>, and other organisations at the aerodrome, such as government agencies, air operators, and retail and food service outlets.

**1.3** Because of the collaborative nature of this work and the fact that anyone working at the aerodrome can notice security threats or vulnerabilities, the aerodrome operator needs to facilitate open communications and good working relationships between all relevant organisations, to run a robust and effective safety programme under Part 100and security programme under Part 139. Positive security culture promotes and maintains a secure environment that supports proactive and effective risk assessment and security practices.

**1.4** New Zealand has both a 'National Aviation Safety Plan' (NASP) and a 'National Civil Aviation Security Programme' (NCASP). This AC should be read alongside the NCASP, which is designed for operators of both security-designated and non-security designated aerodromes. All aerodrome operators have security responsibilities in accordance with the NCASP, so should be familiar with the requirements. Aerodrome operators can ask for a copy of the NCASP from CAA at security.regulation@caa.govt.nz

**Note 1**: Only rules requiring compliance guidance and informative/explanatory material are included in this Advisory Circular. Where a rule is self-explanatory, it is not covered in this AC.

*Note 2:* For details of aerodrome safety programme requirements, see AC100-1, Safety Management.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> AvSec, or an authorised aviation security provider certificated under Civil Aviation Rule Part 140.

## 2.Subpart A – General

### 2.1 Rule 139.3 Definitions

In addition to the definitions in rule 139.3, there are also relevant definitions in Part 1, and Part 12, and in the NCASP, Part 2.1.

### 2.2 Abbreviations

ACE	Aerodrome certification exposition
AEP	Aerodrome emergency plan
AFM	Aircraft flight manual
AIC	Airport Identity Card
ASP	Aerodrome security programme
ATC	Air traffic control
AVP	Airside Vehicle Permit
AvSec	Aviation Security Service
САА	Civil Aviation Authority
CCTV	Closed circuit television
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
NCASP	National Civil Aviation Security Programme
NPS	Non-passenger screening
PSR	Protective Security Requirements
SeMS	Security Management System
SMS	Safety management system

### 2.3 Rule 139.17 Deviations

**2.3.1** To protect life or property, an aerodrome operator may deviate from certain requirements in other Part 139 rules, when this is necessary in an emergency. Aerodrome operators should, however, have processes in place to ensure that the integrity of aerodrome security measures is restored after the situation that led to the emergency being declared is over, and the emergency has been terminated.

**2.3.2** The aerodrome operator must also write to the Director as soon as practicable, and no later than 14 days after the emergency, outlining the emergency, as well as the nature, extent and duration of the deviation, and why it was necessary.

## **3.Subpart B – Certification Requirements**

#### 3.1 Rule 139.75 Safety management

**3.1.1** Aerodrome operators must set up and run an SMS which identifies hazards to aviation safety, and evaluates and manages associated risks, by putting in place mitigations to eliminate, isolate or reduce the risks to an acceptable level.

**3.1.2** Operators could implement a Security Management System (SeMS), integrated with their SMS, which would address security vulnerabilities in the same way, as many of the processes and tasks are similar. The risk assessment process could then also be expanded to evaluate security risks and to focus on minimising vulnerability in the operating environment, because these risks do affect the safety of an aerodrome.

*Note:* There is more information about how to run and maintain an SMS in <u>AC100-1</u>, <u>Safety</u> <u>Management.</u>

**3.1.3** An aerodrome operator should start their risk evaluation and assessment processes by obtaining information about the layout and installations at that aerodrome, to identify points at which the aerodrome infrastructure and any aircraft are most vulnerable to an act of unlawful interference<sup>2</sup>.

**3.1.4** Communication and consultation are an essential part of the risk assessment process. To foster an understanding of security risks at the aerodrome, aerodrome operators should encourage information-sharing and suggestions from anyone involved with the operation of the aerodrome. Ways to do this could include setting up a dedicated mailbox or team for anyone at the aerodrome to contact about security concerns. Acting on these concerns, and communicating changes made to keep people safe, also helps to build a positive security culture.

**3.1.5** CAA's website has detailed advice, guidance and tools to support establishing and maintaining a positive security culture. See:

- Security Culture (<u>https://www.aviation.govt.nz/safety/security-culture/</u>)
- Enhancing your organisation's security culture

# 3.2 Rule 139.77 Aerodrome certification exposition (ACE)

**3.2.1** <u>AC139-2, Aerodrome certification exposition</u>, has guidance on drafting an ACE, in particular a description of the security facilities and procedures that would comply with Part 139, Subpart D.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As defined in Civil Aviation Rule Part 1.

### 3.3 Rule 139.69 Public protection

**3.3.1** Aerodrome operators should ensure public protections by providing sufficient safeguards to deter the inadvertent entry of unauthorised persons, vehicles, and animals to the aerodrome's secure or operational area (i.e. airside).

**3.3.2** The public protection requirement (rule 139.69) should be considered in conjunction with the security requirements in rule 139.203, below, to deter **intentional** unauthorised access. Operators must make sure that all access points, particularly in areas close to the terminals and/or passenger transport aprons are secure, to prevent unauthorised access.

**3.3.3** To support access control and minimise the potential for unauthorised access, consideration should be given to the necessity for any access ways and to reducing these so far as is reasonably practicable. A risk assessment would support understanding the necessity for any access way, the vulnerability these create to the security of the aerodrome and the mitigations necessary to control these. Access ways from public areas to airside security areas should be kept to a minimum.

**3.3.4** Where the physical security provided by the barrier is insufficient to prevent intentional unauthorised entry, aerodromes should post signs on the barrier to deter entry, as per the examples in Appendix C. Aerodrome operators should also consider how unauthorised access is detected, and enable a timely response to any intrusion.

## 4.Subpart C – Aerodrome Operating Requirements

#### 4.1 Rule 139.109 Aerodrome emergency plan (AEP)

**4.1.1** Aerodrome operators are required to establish and maintain an AEP. There is more guidance on AEPs in <u>AC139-14</u>, <u>Aerodrome Certification – Aerodrome Emergency</u> <u>*Plan*</u>.

**4.1.2** Operators need to ensure that staff understand the requirements of the AEP. Operators also need to test the AEP on a regular basis. ICAO guidance suggests a full-scale security-focused exercise to test the AEP's capacity to safeguard the aerodrome against acts of unlawful interference at least every two years, with smaller-scale security exercises (such as tabletop exercises) more frequently. In New Zealand, rule 139.109(2) has the options of either a full emergency exercise every two years, or a series of tests over a three-year period, culminating in a full exercise by the end of the three years.

**4.1.3** The purpose of the exercise is to ensure that those involved with any operational response in an emergency are aware of the systems and processes in place, and to identify weaknesses. By analysing those weaknesses, operators can change and upgrade the AEP so that it is robust enough to manage an actual security emergency.

**4.1.4** In planning exercises, it is important to include security emergencies that happen in both the airside and the landside of the aerodromes.

**4.1.5** Security-related themes and events can be included in a safety-focused emergency exercise. This is due to the similarities in the response, process, and agencies involved in managing SMS and safety and security programmes. When the exercises are conducted in this way, aerodrome operators must ensure significant security elements<sup>3</sup> are included as well as safety elements. Security specific measures and procedures should be appropriately applied and tested during the exercise.

**4.1.6** Aerodrome operators are encouraged to complete regular smaller-scale exercises, in addition to the full-scale exercise, on different portions of the security requirements in the AEP. Carrying out these exercises at least once a year would help personnel who are involved maintain their skills and knowledge and provide for continuous improvement.

**4.1.7** The exercises and findings that result from debriefing sessions should be fully documented and assessed to identify additional needs or deficiencies in the AEP. These documents should be shared with relevant parties involved in the exercise to elicit their feedback. This enables the measures and procedures tested to be re-evaluated and adjusted to remedy potential vulnerabilities. Care should be taken and thought given to the 'need to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A significant security element includes, but is not limited to, impacts on searching, patrolling, and infrastructure protection affecting the ongoing security of aircraft and the aerodrome.

know' principle when sharing information that identifies and discusses security vulnerabilities.

**4.1.8** For any type of exercise, special emergency exercises can be held in the intervening year to correct any problems identified during the previous full-scale exercise.

# 5.Subpart D Aerodrome and navigation installation security

# 5.1 Rule 139.203 Requirements for Tier 1 security designated aerodromes

A Tier 1 security designated aerodrome is one that has been designated as such by the Minister of Transport in accordance with s120 of the Civil Aviation Act 2023 (CA Act).

#### 5.1.1 Rule 139.203 (a), (b) & (c) Barrier requirements

**5.1.1.1** Perimeter barriers and protection should be designed to deter, delay and/or deny inadvertent or intentional unauthorised access, delay intrusion, and help to detect intrusion to any airside security area or security enhanced area within the aerodrome.

**5.1.1.2** Aerodrome operators should consider not only the visible access points, but also hidden entry points such as any ducts, drains, or tunnels that could give access to the security or security-enhanced areas. Any of these entry points must have appropriate access control applied to prevent intentional or inadvertent access.

**5.1.1.3** The aerodrome operator should ensure that the boundary of the airside security area, i.e. the boundary between the airside security area, or security-enhanced area, and landside, is clearly defined. Examples of how to define boundaries are below.

**5.1.1.4** Noting the ability for the Minister to declare landside security areas in accordance with s125 of the CA Act 2023, the aerodrome operator should also understand and clearly define its landside boundary. Where landside security areas are required to be declared by the Minister, this is likely to happen at pace. As such, it is critical for all relevant parties to have rapid access to the information that supports a full understanding of where the aerodromes landside areas extend to. Refer to 'Other Requirements' for further information relating to landside security.

**5.1.1.5** Clear signs are recommended, as detailed in Appendix C of this AC. It should be clear to anyone in the aerodrome, even those who are not regular visitors, which areas they can and cannot enter. The other benefit of signage is to act as a notice as referred to in s364, *Trespass*, in the CA Act 2023. This enables an appropriately authorised person to trespass an unauthorised person found on the aerodrome, if that person does not follow directives not to enter or not to remain in the airside security area or security enhanced area.

**Note**: To align with language changes in the 2023 Act relating to the types of security areas at aerodromes, some references to 'security areas' have been changed to 'airside security areas' in rule 139.203.

**5.1.1.6** Having clearly defined boundaries enables operators to set up adequate safeguarding measures to protect passengers, aerodrome personnel, aircraft and facilities. This is best achieved by having security barriers which prevent access into the

airside security or security-enhanced areas except at designated access points. When the security barriers are installed, the aerodromes must ensure that the barriers do not conflict with the operational requirements of aircraft air navigation or ATC facilities.

**5.1.1.7** Barriers that delay, deter and/or deny access to the airside security area and security-enhanced areas should:

- define the area to be protected, e.g. a perimeter fence which clearly divides the landside area from the security or airside area
- create a physical and psychological deterrent to persons attempting or contemplating unauthorised entry
- delay intrusion and enable operating and security personnel to detect, interrogate and, if necessary, apprehend intruders
- provide designated and readily identifiable places for the entry of personnel and vehicles into the security or security-enhanced areas, and
- ensure that designated entry places are kept to a minimum and secured, or positive access controls are applied. Gates should be constructed to the same standard as perimeter fences.

**5.1.1.8** Aerodrome operators may use buildings and other suitable permanent obstacles as part of the physical security barrier where feasible. If buildings are part of the security barrier, the aerodrome operator must ensure that access through the building used is controlled. This includes making sure that doors, windows, roofs, ventilation openings, ducts etc. are securely locked or protected with bars, grilles, screens or other equivalent means, if such openings are located less than three metres above ground level or less than three metres from structures outside the security barrier. The aerodrome operator should ensure barriers are regularly inspected and maintained, to make sure they are still effective. Issues that could compromise the integrity of the barrier (such as corrosion which can be common in New Zealand's environment) must be promptly addressed.

**5.1.1.9** In addition to barriers, additional security features may be deployed to better deter, delay, deny and detect unauthorised access. Such features may include barbed or razor wire topping, a perimeter intrusion detection system, sufficiently applied lighting, and a CCTV system.

**5.1.1.10** Security fences and other barriers should be designed and placed to deter and/or prevent people being able to scale, or throw sabotage devices, banned substances, or other unauthorised articles that could be used for unlawful interference, onto or near an aerodrome. To ensure sufficient height and durability, barriers should be:

- no less than 2,440 mm (2.44 m) high
- designed to be very difficult to climb, by using inclined barbed wire or razor-taped wire (subject to New Zealand's fencing regulations)

- made of material that resists bending, and
- constructed to prevent a person from pulling it up at the bottom and crawling or burrowing under, e.g. by digging very deep holes to anchor the fences into the ground or fixing them to a concrete base or sill.

**5.1.1.11** Aerodrome operators must ensure that barriers to airside security areas prevent unauthorised access at all times. Barriers should also be:

- inspected regularly, based on a risk assessment which considers the topography, surrounding area and environment, and
- maintained to keep them effective and in good condition.

**5.1.1.12** In addition to structural barriers, aerodrome operators may consider the natural environment and the extent to which this provides a barrier to entry and achieves a commensurate level of security. Specifically, natural barriers should be considered, including (but not limited to) cliffs, water and swamp. The choice of these should be supported by a risk assessment. Where these natural barriers don't provide an equivalent level of security, structural security enhancements will be required.

**Note:** Further information can be found in this document in s139.207 concerning prohibited actions affecting security.

## 5.2 Rule 139.203(d) - Other requirements for Tier 1 security designated aerodromes

## 5.2.1 Rule 139.203(d)(1) Isolated area for aircraft subject to unlawful interference

**5.2.1.1** The aerodrome operator shall identify an isolated area for aircraft which is known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference, or for other reasons needs isolation from normal aerodrome activities, to park. Such an area should be selected to minimise disruption to normal aerodrome operations, and any damage or harm to people on or around the aerodrome, aerodrome facilities, infrastructure, and other aircraft, should there be a suspected IED, or other threat on the aircraft.

**5.2.1.2** When selecting the predetermined isolated area, operators should consider a site that:

- makes it easy to evacuate passengers safely
- allows law enforcement officers and security personnel to perform their duties, and
- provides continuance, so far as is reasonably practicable, of normal air traffic in and out of the airport, or re-establishing business as usual after the incident.

Operators should also designate a second isolated area in case the first area is unavailable.

**5.2.1.3** Isolated aircraft parking positions should have a minimum distance of 100 m, or the maximum distance possible, from other normal aircraft parking positions, buildings or public

areas, etc. The aerodrome operator should check that isolated parking positions are not located over any underground utilities such as gas and aviation fuel and, to the extent feasible, electrical or communication cables or near other storage facilities that may present additional risk(s). Floodlighting should be provided to the designated isolated aircraft parking positions intended to be used at night.

#### 5.2.2 Rule 139.203(d)(2) & (3) Lighting and emergency lighting

**5.2.2.1** Sufficient lighting deters potential intruders, since well-lit areas make intruders more noticeable and make it harder for any unauthorised person to access an aircraft without being detected.

**5.2.2.2** To ensure lighting supports good security outcomes, aerodrome operators should refer to the lighting requirements specified in AC 139-6 and consider:

- whether the lighting is powerful enough to make any person approaching the aircraft clearly visible from a distance of 200 m with the naked eye
- lighting ensures that security-enhanced areas and areas of potential security vulnerability are well-lit, with even lighting coverage so that there are no dark or blind spots, and
- if sensor-activated lighting is used, when any aircraft within the area is approached:
  - o all approaches to the affected aircraft are covered by the sensors
  - the sensors are tamper-proof and provide instant lighting, and
  - vapour filled lights requiring a warm-up period are not used, since they are not suitable in such situations.

**5.2.2.3** At Tier 1 security designated aerodromes, all lighting should be:

- checked daily for damage with spare parts kept readily available
- powered by mains with a secondary supply should the mains power fail, and
- protected against unlawful interference.

**5.2.2.4** For designated isolated parking areas, aerodrome operators must arrange for permanent and/or portable high intensity lighting for aircraft under threat of unlawful interference.

**5.2.2.5** Where the areas are used at night, the lighting should be turned on within 30 minutes of the aircraft being brought to the area. If permanent lighting is not available, light from an alternative power supply or portable floodlights must be available within 30 minutes.

**5.2.2.6** While aerodrome rescue fire services are encouraged to carry emergency lighting equipment, aerodrome operators could also meet requirements by setting up agreements with nearby equipment hire companies to provide emergency lighting equipment after normal working hours, should it be required.

#### 5.2.3 Rule 139.203(d)(4) and (4A) Areas for searching

**5.2.3.1** The searching of passengers and cabin baggage is one of the most important basic measures to prevent threat items from being introduced on to an aircraft. It is a fundamental aviation security principle that searching and sterile areas shall be established, and controlled, to prevent the mixing of searched and unsearched persons, baggage and things.

**5.2.3.2** Aerodrome operators should understand the threats and risks (including vulnerabilities) to the sterile area. Measures to ensure the integrity of the sterile area should include sufficient barriers, access controls, procedures, pathways and any signage necessary to prevent the mixing of searched and unsearched passengers, crew and things. This includes transit and transfer passengers, crew and their things.

**5.2.3.3** As part of aerodrome development and planning, aerodrome operators should collaborate with other airport agencies and stakeholders. Aerodrome operators should establish and design areas in the aerodrome that support other organisations operating in the aerodrome to carry out their operations in a manner that meets necessary security objectives.

**5.2.3.4** Sections 232 and 241 of the CA Act 2023 require that airport operators consult substantial customers and relevant government agencies on spatial plans and put an obligation on the airport to provide a regulatory airport spatial undertaking (RASU) to the Secretary for Transport. This process is managed by the Ministry of Transport.

**5.2.3.5** Aerodrome operators must make space available for the searching of passengers, crew and baggage. We recommend that in providing these areas for searching the aerodrome operator should, in collaboration with an aviation security service provider and other critical stakeholders, consider several factors including (but not limited to):

- the physical security searching equipment, surveillance equipment and supporting infrastructure necessary to achieve the desired aviation security outcomes. This can include x-ray machines, walk through metal detectors, body-scanners, explosive trace detection systems, CCTV etc
- any facilities before and after the screening point that would support persons subject to searching with any unpacking or packing of things, so that passenger flow is not unduly impacted (for example, benches are commonly installed at many airports after the screening points to enable passengers to clear the screening point and repack their things so as not to unduly delay the searching process)
- any facilities necessary to support and respectfully search passengers in sensitive situations. This could include passengers who need to adjust clothing for the purposes

of a pat-down search, those with sensitive medical issues, situations where religious or cultural etiquette may need to be considered, or any other sensitive situation

• Flight scheduling, expected passenger volume and any impacts that may have on queues, ponding areas or crowded spaces and sterile area capacity etc.

**5.2.3.6** Worker searching is a requirement at security designated aerodromes (commonly known as non-passenger screening or 'NPS'). NPS, when considered necessary by the Minister or Director, requires that persons, items, substances and vehicles are searched prior to entry into, or within, the security enhanced area. NPS may be delivered using fixed and non-fixed (roving) screening points.

**5.2.3.7** To give effect to NPS requirements, aerodrome operators should:

- ensure the searching of any vehicle and its occupants can occur without risk to those conducting the search or being searched
- ensure the safety and security of persons being searched, including where sensitive situations may arise, and
- enable a vehicle to get out of the traffic and for its occupants to be interacted with safely.

**5.2.3.8** The spatial requirements for aviation security should be regularly reviewed to ensure they continue to be suitable for the delivery of this service.

Aerodrome operators are encouraged to consult CAA at <u>security.regulation@caa.govt.nz</u> when sterile areas and security enhanced areas are being planned to ensure that necessary regulatory requirements are considered and integrated throughout the design process.

#### 5.2.4 Rule 139.203(d)(5) Searching areas for domestic passengers

**5.2.4.1** There may be cases where aerodrome operators need to search domestic passenger(s) to the same standards as required for international passengers, as outlined in the section on rule 139.203(d)(4) and (4A), above. This may include persons currently subject to domestic searching requirements and/or passengers not currently subject to searching.

**5.2.4.2** Aerodrome operators are expected to establish a contingency plan for how they would do this. There is no set standard for how fast aerodrome operators would need to set up a domestic searching area; however, security threats can move at an exceptionally high pace and without notice.

**5.2.4.3** Changes to the threat environment could lead to almost immediate additional security requirements that could last for either an extended period, or be reduced more gradually and over time. A contingency plan for enhanced domestic searching requirement(s) should be developed collaboratively with all critical stakeholders and include details of:

- where any required searching area(s) and security areas would be
- how these areas would be identified, designated, secured and controlled
- the necessary people and resources to implement and maintain any additional searching and security controls
- any additional technology, communications or infrastructure support that would be required, including how this would be implemented and notified
- any procedures necessary to support the contingency plan.

**Note:** Further information on additional and scalable contingency measures that may be required in the event of threat level changes can be found in Appendix J of the NCASP. There is more guidance on AEPs in <u>AC139-14</u>, <u>Aerodrome Certification – Aerodrome</u> <u>Emergency Plan</u>.

#### 5.2.5 Rule 139.203(d)(7) Design of areas and access control

**5.2.5.1** Aerodrome operators have the responsibility to control access to their aerodromes, particularly access to the airside security areas. This requires collaboration with aviation security service providers, air operators and any other party with access control responsibilities and/or duties.

**5.2.5.2** The aerodrome operator may agree that tenants or occupiers to whose concession or facility forms a part of the landside and airside security boundary of any aerodrome, or through which access can be gained from landside to airside, is responsible for controlling access through their facility and ensuring security controls are applied with respect to personnel, goods, supplies, equipment or vehicles.

**5.2.5.3** Where this occurs, formal interoperability agreements should be established and overseen by the aerodrome operator to ensure effective security controls are established and maintained, risks managed and that the aerodromes requirements for access control continue to be met. This is also reinforced in rules 108.53 and 108.55. These tenants or occupiers need to ensure that:

- access is restricted to only those persons with a legitimate operational need or requirement to enter the airside security area
- no unauthorised access of persons or vehicles is permitted, and
- no goods, supplies, items or things which could be used to compromise security are transferred from landside to airside.

**5.2.5.4** The access controls for areas used for screening and sterile areas must be designed so that only authorised persons and things are allowed access. Any person entering these areas must be security searched through a screening point.

**5.2.5.5** Where access control cards are provided by the aerodrome operator to persons requiring access (or by a third party subject any formal agreement with the aerodrome operator), the aerodrome operator should ensure that systems and processes are in place which positively link these access cards to the individual to whom they are issued, and prevent any unauthorised use, so far as is reasonably practicable.

**5.2.6.6** This may include issuing access control cards which contain pertinent information such as the photograph and the name of the bearer, as well as the position, company and the expiry date of the card. So far as practicable, the expiry date for these access cards should be linked to the expiry date for an Airport Identity Card.

#### 5.3.5 Rule 139.203(d)(8) Training

**5.3.5.1** Aerodrome operators must ensure appropriate security training is provided to all aerodrome personnel, including those responsible for the implementation of landside security measures. Training methods can be varied, such as classroom-based sessions or online-based learning, complete with a competence assessment such as a quiz or a questionnaire.

**5.3.5.2** Training must be tailored to different levels appropriate to the functions a specific person performs and must include training on security awareness, and where persons responsible for implementing security controls (including landside security controls), the level of training necessary to support effective implementation of those controls. Airside workers will necessarily be required to complete more detailed training on their security requirements and responsibilities given their role requires access to airside security areas and security enhanced areas.

**5.3.5.3** Aerodrome operators must ensure all organisations operating at the aerodrome receive appropriate security training from the aerodrome or have an approved security training programme. One way to ensure this is for an aerodrome operator to make its inhouse security training part of the application for aerodrome access, as it ensures everyone granted access by the aerodrome has been trained and assessed on their security responsibilities to a level that meets the standards required.

**5.3.5.4** An organisation (including organisations only operating landside), may also, as part of its approval to operate at the aerodrome, supply its security training programme to the aerodrome operator for approval. Agreements for organisations to provide their own training should be recorded, and organisations need to be made aware that they have to provide any updates to the security training to the aerodrome operator.

Note: More advice about training is contained in Appendix A of this AC.

## 5.3.6 Rule 139.203(d)(9) Identifying, reporting breaches and deficiencies in security procedures

**5.3.6.1** Identifying and managing an aerodrome's security vulnerabilities and risks is a key part of an aerodrome's security management. Because it involves similar ongoing monitoring and assessment processes as managing an aerodrome's SMS, it may be possible to monitor risks to security along with risks to safety. Pro-active identification of

system vulnerabilities is vital, to ensure available security resources can be focused in the highest priority risk areas.

**5.3.6.2** While there is a requirement to report, essentially, an act of unlawful interference in accordance with rule part 12, this rule (139.203(d)(9)) requires reporting to be provided to the Director for **any** breach of security procedures or deficiency in security at the aerodrome. This enables and supports the Director's requirement to maintain an awareness of threats and risks to aviation security, including vulnerability, that may be exploited to facilitate an attack.

**5.3.6.3** Aerodromes must have procedures in place that are sufficient to identify breaches or deficiencies and report them to the Director. Reporting to the Director may follow the 'Aviation Related Concern' process provided for here: <u>Aviation concerns | aviation.govt.nz</u> or information can be forwarded directly to <u>security.regulation@caa.govt.nz</u>.

**5.3.6.4** Active reporting is a key part of managing security risks and vulnerabilities effectively. Further information and guidance on the importance of reporting systems can be found here: <u>Security culture | aviation.govt.nz</u>. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service has also produced useful guidance to help identify signs of <u>violent extremism</u>.

#### 5.3.7 Rule 139.203(d)(10) Security of services

**5.3.7.1** When assessing security risks, aerodromes and operators of ATC facilities should consider services essential to the operation of the aerodrome or facility and support infrastructure. These services include suppliers or contractors coming to an aerodrome to make deliveries or undertake construction, maintenance and repairs.

**5.3.7.2** International trends have highlighted increased awareness amongst terrorists of security weaknesses in aerodromes that leave aerodromes vulnerable to attack through energy, communications, cyber systems, water, sewerage and access road systems. The threats posed by deliberate cyber-attacks on civil aviation also continue to rapidly evolve.

5.3.7.3 Aerodrome operators should:

- consider the potential for major civil disorder or sabotage to destroy or severely disrupt services essential to aviation operations, and
- consider their critical information and communication systems and, in accordance with a risk assessment, protect these from cyber-threats and risks that could lead to an act of unlawful interference, and
- develop realistic contingency plans to keep people at the aerodrome safe and ensure essential operations can continue.

**5.3.7.4** As the security environment changes, aerodromes may need to implement improvements in their security and cyber-security systems and further develop contingency plans. This is particularly relevant for infrastructure changes, which should be assessed through a security lens. The responsible organisations are encouraged to review aspects of security and cyber-security at least annually.

#### 5.3.8 Rule 139.203(d)(11) Security perimeter signage

**5.3.8.1** The Director, or person authorised by the Director, in accordance with s364 of the CA Act 2023, may require aerodromes to affix signs at the perimeters of the airside security or security enhanced areas in a security designated aerodrome. These signs have the same legal standing as if they were affixed by the Director. Aerodromes should contact <u>security.regulation@caa.govt.nz</u> when seeking to have persons authorised in accordance with s364 of the CA Act 2023.

**5.3.8.2** Approved security signs must be displayed at security designated aerodromes and security designated navigation installations. These signs legally define the boundary or perimeter of the area and the protections afforded to the security areas of an aerodrome. In addition, they act as a form of deterrence.

**5.3.8.3** The standards and specification of the security perimeter signage are outlined in Appendix C of this AC. For further information relating to airport signage please contact signs@caa.govt.nz or visit the CAA website: <u>Aviation security | aviation.govt.nz</u>.

#### 5.3.9 Rule 139.203(d)(12) Vehicle control

**5.3.9.1** Operators of security designated aerodromes must establish that unauthorised vehicles (and their occupants and things) are not granted access to airside security areas and security enhanced areas.

**5.3.9.2** Vehicle control procedures must make it clear that:

- Only authorised vehicles and occupants can enter the airside security areas and security enhanced areas. No prohibited items may be taken into the airside security area or security enhanced area without lawful excuse
- All occupants must be in possession of a valid AIC in accordance with rule 19.357, *Airport identity cards*
- Occupants have been appropriately trained (e.g. by taking part in standard aerodrome security training as outlined in the section on rule 139.203(d)(8))
- Non-service vehicles are only authorised to enter the aerodrome if they regularly need to, and aerodrome operators may require those vehicles to remain airside when not in use to minimise traffic flow at access points
- Vehicles that must access the security and security enhanced areas infrequently, may need to be escorted, to ensure they do not enter dangerous areas or causes increased risks in the airside security area
- The owner and/or operator of an authorised vehicle and their contact details should be identified and recorded, along with the vehicle registration
- Approved drivers of the vehicle and their contact details should be clearly listed where possible. If this is not possible, the aerodrome operator should require the owner of the authorised vehicle to establish a procedure to identify the driver at any given time
- Aerodrome operators must give clear directions about the areas an authorised vehicle is permitted to enter and remain, and the reason for the vehicle to enter the airside

security area or security-enhanced area, as well as any other restrictions on access points or conditions of entry

- Vehicle operators should be aware of these restrictions and ensure they are recorded and readily available to drivers and other vehicle occupants during inspections
- Authorisation records for vehicles (also called AVPs) should be established for a clearly defined validity period which considers the purpose and timeframe for which authorised airside security area access is required and is:
  - displayed in a visible and prominent position at the front of the vehicle while in the security and security enhanced area, and
  - unique to the vehicle, displaying the vehicle registration and the authorisation expiry date
- Vehicle occupants' AICs and vehicle passes can be checked at any airside security area entry points and may be checked while airside either visually by authorised persons, or electronically by an equally effective system
- Authorisation records must be retained for two years from the time the authorisation expires and in a manner such they can be retrieved when needed
- Any vehicles, vehicle occupants and things entering the security-enhanced area may be subject to NPS
- Unidentifiable unattended vehicles found in the airside security areas or security enhanced areas may be treated as suspicious. Aerodrome operators should:
  - check when and how the vehicle entered the airside security area, any activities associated with the vehicle, and if any security risk can be identified
  - take appropriate actions to mitigate any security risks
  - if no concern is identified, try to identify the owner/driver to identify any vulnerabilities that allowed such vehicle entering the airside security area, and
  - only allow the vehicle to remain within the airside security area if they are satisfied that it poses no security risks.
- Emergency vehicles attending to emergencies will not be subject to the above requirements.

**5.3.9.3** Aerodrome operators are encouraged to create a security culture within the airport in which it is standard for vehicles to:

- be locked or supervised
- have keys removed when left unattended, and
- be locked when outside the aerodrome security or security-enhanced areas.

## 5.4 Rule 139.205 Requirements for non-security designated aerodromes

#### 5.4.1 Rule 139.205 (a)(1) Contingency planning

**5.4.1.1** To ensure a smooth flow of operations, aerodrome operators must have a contingency plan for the implementation of screening and additional security controls when required by the Director. For a contingency plan to be acceptable, aerodrome operators should refer to the acceptable means of compliance outlined earlier in this document, and it must include information regarding:

- areas required for the screening of passengers, crew and baggage
- areas required for the delivery of non-passenger screening
- sterile areas where screened passengers and crew are prevented from having access to unauthorised articles or contact with unscreened persons, and
- areas for the separation of screened and unscreened passengers and crew, including transit and transfer passengers and crew

**5.4.1.2** As previously noted, there is no set standard for how fast aerodrome operators would need to set up a domestic searching area; however, security threats can move at an exceptionally high pace and without notice. Changes to the threat environment could lead to almost immediate additional security requirements that could last for either an extended period or be reduced more gradually and over time. A contingency plan for enhanced domestic searching requirement(s) should be developed collaboratively with all critical stakeholders, to ensure areas provided would be effective in ensuring the security outcome required.

**5.4.1.3** Like all plans, the contingency plan should be regularly reviewed and amended to ensure it remains suitable.

#### 5.4.2 Rule 139.205(2) Other security requirements

**5.4.2.1** For advice on lighting and emergency lighting requirements, refer to the information in the section on rule 139.203(d)(2) and (3). For advice on identification, reporting breaches and deficiencies in security procedures, refer to the information in the section on rule 139.203(d)(9).

#### 5.4.3 Rule 139.205(b)(1) and (2) Security awareness group

5.4.3.1 The purpose of a security awareness group is to:

- (a) promote awareness of security issues, methods, and practices at non-security designated aerodromes
- (b) encourage a pro-active, collaborative approach to achieve practical and effective security measures in the domestic aviation environment, and
- (c) establish and maintain an effective method of communicating information on security to all group members, usually representatives of the organisations with a

presence at the aerodrome, or with aerodrome responsibilities (such as city or regional councils).

**5.4.3.2** The aerodrome operator should convene meetings at regular intervals. The rule requires that the interval between these meetings do not exceed 12 months. Aerodrome operators should consider the outcome that this requirement seeks to address and consider a more frequent rhythm which provides for security awareness and culture to be proactively managed.

**5.4.3.3** Key functions of the security awareness group include:

- reviewing:
  - o the security of vulnerable points, including essential equipment and facilities
  - security measures to ensure they are sufficient, and
  - o current security risks and the effectiveness of controls, and
  - the provision of security awareness training other than to those employed, engaged, or contracted to the aerodrome operator.
- recommending improvements to aviation security
- ensuring that any such proposals, recommendations or initiatives gathered from the group are promulgated to all organisations at the aerodrome.

#### 5.4.4 Rule 139.205 (c) and (d) Security training

Refer to the information contained above in the section on 139.203(d)(8) and Appendix A for further guidance.

# 5.5 Rule 139.207 Prohibited actions affecting security

**5.5.1** This rule establishes prohibitions in relation to fences, gates and access controls, namely that they must not be left open or insecure, and that any article which could be used to evade security controls must not be left in the vicinity. To achieve this in practice, aerodrome operators must ensure the security fence lines are kept clear of any article, vehicle, stowed equipment, or other material for at least 1.5 metres, on either side of the fence or barrier. This distance should be measured:

- for the outside of the fence, i.e. the landside or public area, from a vertical line extending down from the extreme outer edge of the fencing structure (including the out-rigger), and
- for the inside of the fence, i.e. the secure area or airside, from the outer edge of any post, brace or other fencing support.

**5.5.2** In situations where it is impractical to keep the outside of the fence completely clear due to a fixed obstruction, equipment or object, the fence or other barrier must continue to achieve the desired outcome. This may include extending the barrier upwards, so that it is at least 2.44 m above the height of such article or obstruction.

### 6.Appendix A – Training

**6.1** Any security training programme should ensure personnel at the aerodrome, whether landside or airside:

- are trained in good security practices and culture
- understand the principles and implementation of security awareness, and
- understand their responsibilities for aerodrome security.

**6.2** Any training required under rule 139.203(d)(8) and/or 139.205(c)<sup>4</sup> is to be carried out by a person with the required knowledge, experience and competency in the subjects to be taught. Security awareness training should focus on developing and running training that fits the context of the overall security requirements of the aerodrome.

**6.3** The aerodrome operator needs to decide appropriate initial and recurrent training needs for the different categories of personnel involved in security. Some parts of the training may be the same through all levels of the organisation, but others will need to be tailored to the needs of personnel in different roles.

**6.4** A recommended method of matching the training needs of different personnel with the courses or modules available is a training matrix/register in which:

- each category of personnel whose activities involve security is listed on the vertical axis, and
- the various training modules available, and the areas for which training needs to be developed are listed on the horizontal axis.
- 6.5 This makes it easier for training planners to work out:
- what training modules or courses are available
- what else needs to be developed to ensure personnel are properly trained
- the areas each category of personnel need to be trained in, and
- to use that to build a picture of security training needs across the organisation, by course and also by who needs to do which course.

**6.6** Operators need accurate records for every person who is trained. These should be more than a record of attendance and include information on:

- when a person was trained in each segment of training that is undertaken,
- the method of assessment
- results of test or examinations or comprehension exercise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Section 13(4) of the CA Act 2023 is also relevant.

- a complete picture of that person's instruction, and
- a full assessment of that person's competence to understand and perform the security measures in which they have been trained.

**6.7** As well as ensuring continued knowledge and competence, recurrent training, at no more than three-yearly intervals, should cover changes to:

- regulatory requirements and standards
- the organisation's procedures and programme, and
- threats affecting the organisation's operations.
- **6.8** The aerodrome operator must have procedures:
- that define the minimum required levels of competence for each topic
- to assess the results of training, such as presentations or examinations
- that show how trainers assess learners to ensure a person has been trained successfully.

## 7. Appendix B – Security Signage

**Note 1:** These signs should be displayed prominently in operational areas that are not airside security areas or security-enhanced but are adjacent to them.

**Note 2:** The signs are subject to changes in legislation and the NCASP. Operators should keep up to date with changes to the NCASP to ensure they have the correct signage.

#### Security designated aerodromes

Approved security signs must be displayed at security designated aerodromes and security designated navigation installations.

The Director of Civil Aviation may declare, by a sign or signs affixed at the perimeter thereof, that an area within any security designated aerodrome or security designated navigation installation is an airside security area, under the Civil Aviation Act 2023, <u>section 121</u>. The specifications for each sign shall be as follows:

#### Airside Security Area signs

Class 1 Gate Signs	Size	750 mm x 600 mm	
AIRSIDE	Backing	Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium.	
SECURITY AREA	Fixing	Securely fixed next to or on each perimeter fence gate, clearly visible at all times to pedestrians and persons in vehicles, whether the gate is open or closed	
ACCESS PROHIBITED - AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED	Text	AIRSIDE SECURITY AREA	60mm high letters in red printing on white background
UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION		ACCESS PROHIBITED - AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	30mm high letters in black printing on a white background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10mm high letters in black printing on a white background
Class 2 Fence Signs	Size	750 mm x 200 mm	
	Backing	Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium.	

Fixing AIRSIDE SECURITY AREA CAR UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED DIFECTOR OF GVIL AVIATION		<ul> <li>Securely fixed to fences or barriers as follows:</li> <li>(a) Adjacent to terminal buildings at not more than 30 m b</li> <li>(b) Along fence lines with direct access to public roads or of</li> <li>(c) In more remote areas to which the public do not have a</li> <li>(d) Where practicable they should be fixed approximately a</li> <li>(e) On automatic or controlled access points to be so located persons/vehicles whether the gate is opened or closed.</li> </ul>	other public areas at not more than 70m between signs. access, not more than 200 m between signs. 1.5 m from ground level.
	Text	AIRSIDE SECURITY AREA	60mm high letters in red printing on white background
		UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED	40mm high letters in black printing on a white background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10mm high letters in black printing on a white background
Class 3 Door Signs Size		500 mm x 350 mm	
AIRSIDE	Backing	Backing – Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors or glass.	
SECURITY AREA		These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to security ar whether doors are open or closed.	eas so that the signs are clearly visible to all persons
ACCESS PROHIBITED - AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	Text	AIRSIDE SECURITY AREA	40mm high letters in red print on white or clear background
DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION		ACCESS PROHIBITED – AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	15mm high letters in black print on white or clear background

		Director of Civil Aviation	10 mm high letters in black print on white or clear background
Class 4 Door Signs	Size	500 mm x 350 mm	
AIRSIDE	Backing	Backing – Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors o	r glass.
	Fixing	These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to security a whether doors are open or closed.	areas so that the signs are clearly visible to all persons
AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	Text	AIRSIDE SECURITY AREA	40mm high letters in red print on white or clear background
DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION		PASSENGERS AND AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	15mm high letters in black print on white or clear background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black print on white or clear background

#### Security Enhanced Area signs

Class 1 Gate Signs	Size	750 mm x 600 mm
	Backing	Backing – Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium.

SECURITY Fixin		These signs shall be securely fixed adjacent to or on each perir pedestrians and persons in vehicles whether the gate is open o	
CA/Ā	Text	SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	60 mm high letters in red printing on a white background
ACCESS PROHIBITED - AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED		ACCESS PROHIBITED - AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	30 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
Class 2 Fence Signs	Size	750 mm x 200 mm	
SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	Backing	Backing – Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium.	
	Fixing	To be securely fixed to fences or barriers as follows:	
		(a) Adjacent to terminal buildings at not more than 30 n	n between signs.
		(b) Along fence lines with direct access to public roads o	or other public areas at not more than 70 m between signs.
		(c) In more remote areas to which the public do not have access, not more than 200 m between signs.	
		(d) Where practicable they should be fixed approximately 1.5 m from ground level.	
		(e) On automatic or controlled access points to be so loo persons/vehicles whether the gate is opened or closed.	cated that they are clearly visible to approaching
	Text	SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	60 mm high letters in red printing on a white background
		UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED	40 mm high letters in black printing on a white background

		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
Class 3 Open Boundary Signs	Size	750 mm x 200 mm	
<u>Between security and SEAs</u> within aerodrome	Backing	Backing – Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium	
operational areas	Fixing	These signs are to be securely fixed as follows:	
SECURITY ENHANCED AREA CAR SEARCHING MAY BE REQUIRED DIFECTOR OF CVIL ANATION		<ul> <li>(a) Adjacent to vehicle roadways within security areas where such roadways enter into the SEA.</li> <li>(b) At such a height and manner to be so located that they are clearly visible to persons driving approaching vehicles.</li> <li>(c) Adjacent to other points to which access can be formally gained to an SEA from the wider security areas with cognisance to the particular circumstances in question.</li> </ul>	
	Text	SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	60 mm high letters in red printing on a white background
		SEARCHING MAY BE REQUIRED	40 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
Class 4 Door Signs	Size	500 mm x 350 mm	
	Backing	Backing – Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors or glass	
	Fixing	These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to security persons whether doors are open or closed.	enhanced areas so that the signs are clearly visible to all
	Text	SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	40 mm high letters in red printing on a white or clear background

SECURITY ENHANCED AREA		ACCESS PROHIBITED – AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	15 mm high letters in black printing on a white or clear background
AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white or clear background
<u>Class 5 – Door Signs</u>	Size	500 mm x 350 mm	
SECURITY	Backing	Backing – Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors o	pr glass
	Fixing	These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to security persons whether doors are open or closed.	enhanced areas so that the signs are clearly visible to all
AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	Text	SECURITY ENHANCED AREA	40 mm high letters in red printing on a white or clear background
DIRECTOR OF ONL AVAILON		ACCESS PROHIBITED – AUTHORISED PERSONS ONLY AIRPORT IDENTITY CARDS MUST BE DISPLAYED UNAUTHORISED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE REMOVED OR ARRESTED	15 mm high letters in black printing on a white or clear background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white or clear background

#### Non-security designated aerodromes

Approved operational area signs should be displayed at non-security designated aerodromes. The specifications for each sign shall be as follows:

Advisory Circular

Class 1 Operational Area	Size	390 mm x 490 mm	350 mm x 450 mm
OPERATIONAL AREA	Backing	Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium.	Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors or glass
CAA UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED PASSENGERS ONLY BEYOND THIS POINT	Fixing	These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to operation whether doors are open or closed.	onal areas so that the signs are clearly visible to all persons
TRESPASSERS ARE LIABLE TO REMOVAL AND PROSECUTION	Text	OPERATIONAL AREA	40 mm high letters in red printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)
DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION		UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED PASSENGERS ONLY BEYOND THIS POINT TRESPASSERS ARE LIABLE TO REMOVAL AND PROSECUTION	15 mm high letters in black printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)
Class 2 Operational Area	Size	390 mm x 490 mm	350 mm x 450 mm
OPERATIONAL AREA	Backing	Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium	Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors or glass
UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED Fixing		These signs shall be fixed at all access-ways leading to operation whether doors are open or closed.	onal areas so that the signs are clearly visible to all persons
AND PROSECUTION	Text	Operational Area	40 mm high letters in red printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)
		UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED TRESPASSERS ARE LIABLE TO REMOVAL AND PROSECUTION	15 mm high letters in black printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background (aluminium) or white or clear background (adhesive)

Class 3 Operational Area	Size	240 mm x 790 mm	200 mm x 750 mm
OPERATIONAL AREA	Backing	Of not less strength than 18-gauge aluminium	Adhesive backing, to be firmly fixed on walls, doors or glass
UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED	Fixing	These signs are to be securely fixed to fences or barriers as follows:	
etilis Direction of CAL AVAILON		(a) Adjacent to terminal buildings at not more than 30 m between signs	
	(b) Along fence lines with direct access to public roads or other public ar		r other public areas at not more than 70 m between signs
		(c) In more remote areas to which the public do not hav	e access, not more than 200 m between signs
(d) Where practicable they s		(d) Where practicable they should be fixed approximate	ly 1.5 m from ground level
		(e) On automatic or controlled access points to be so located that they are clearly visible to approaching persons/vehicles whether the gate is open or closed	
	Text	OPERATIONAL AREA	60 mm high letters in red printing on a white background
		UNAUTHORISED ACCESS PROHIBITED	40 mm high letters in black printing on a white background
		DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION	10 mm high letters in black printing on a white background