Sometimes an aircraft or component has a safety problem that requires all other aircraft of the same type to be checked. To achieve that, the Director issues an airworthiness directive (AD). The CAA issues new and amended ADs monthly, but emergency ADs can be issued at any time.


FAA AD 2020-22-07 Bell 412 Helicopters(external link)

Effective: 18 November 2020

Details: FAA AD 2020-22-07 with effective date 18 November 2020 is applicable to:

  • Model 412 helicopters with S/N 33001 through to 33107 inclusive, S/N 33108 through 33213 inclusive, S/N 34001 through 34024 inclusive, or S/N 36001 through 36019 inclusive;
  • Model 412 helicopters with S/N 36020 through 36086 inclusive;
  • Model 412EP helicopters with S/N 36087 through 36999 inclusive, S/N 37002 through 37999 inclusive, S/N 38001 through 38999 inclusive, or S/N 39101 through 39999; and
  • Model 412CF helicopters, all S/N.

This FAA AD is prompted by an overseas accident and multiple reports of finding cracked main gearbox (MGB) support cases.  The FAA is issuing this AD to address excessive pylon pitch vibrations. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in structural failure of the MGB support case and subsequent reduced control of the helicopter. This AD requires revising the helicopter AFM.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0224-E AS 350 and AS 355 helicopters(external link)

Effective: 20 Oct 2020

Details: EASA AD 2020-0224-E with effective date 20 October 2020 is applicable to AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 BB, AS 350 B1, AS350 B2 and AS 350 D helicopters, all S/N; and AS 355 E, AS 355 F, AS 355 F1, AS 355 F2 and AS 355 N helicopters, all S/N.

This AD is prompted by two recent occurrences reported to EASA of finding large debonding of TRB leading edge (LE) protection shields.

The design and assembly procedure of the affected part is such that rapid debonding can occur if humidity/liquid water reaches the bonding surface between LE and blade spar.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of tail rotor control and possible loss of helicopter control.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus Helicopters issued an applicable ASB to provide inspection instructions.

For the reason described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the affected parts and, depending on findings, replacement.

This AD also requires modification of the helicopter with the installation of serviceable parts, and prohibits (re)installation of affected parts.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0217-E AS 350 and AS 355 helicopters (external link)

Effective: 08 Oct 2020

Details: AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 B1, AS 350 B2 and AS 350 D helicopters, all S/N and AS 355 E, AS 355 F, AS 355 F1 and AS 355 F2 helicopters, all S/N - Cyclic Stick Grip Up/Down Hoist Control Switch.

EASA AD 2020-0217-E with effective date 8 October 2020 is applicable to AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 B1, AS 350 B2 and AS 350 D helicopters, all S/N and AS 355 E, AS 355 F, AS 355 F1 and AS 355 F2 helicopters, all S/N.

Affected part: UP/DOWN switches for rescue hoist control, installed on DUNLOP cyclic stick grips P/N AC66444.

The applicable ASB: Airbus Helicopters (AH) AS350 Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 01.00.72 and AS355 ASB 01.00.58 (single document).

This AD is prompted by a report of an unintended release of the rescue hoist hook on an AS 350 B2 helicopter during a ground check. The operator was using the affected part, when the hoist’s electrically-actuated cable cutter function was activated.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in events of inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cutter function and consequent detachment of an external load, or person from the helicopter hoist, possibly resulting in personal injury, or injury to persons on the ground.

To address this potential unsafe condition, AH has issued an ASB to introduce an operational limitation.

For the reason described above, this AD requires installation of a dedicated placard in the cockpit, prohibits the in-flight use of the affected part, and amends the applicable Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).

This AD is considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0206 - A119 and AW119MKII helicopters(external link)

Effective: 14 Oct 2020

Details: A119 and AW119MKII helicopters, all S/N – Gearbox Output Shaft.

EASA AD 2020-0206 with effective date 14 October 2020 supersedes EASA AD 2018-0156 and is applicable to A119 and AW119MKII helicopters, all S/N.

Affected parts: 90° tail rotor gearbox (TGB) shafts with P/N 109-0443-03-107 (installed on TGB P/N 109-0440-06-01-101, or P/N 109-0440-06-105), and a S/N as listed in Appendix 1 of this AD.

The AD is prompted by two reported occurrences of finding corrosion in the internal surface of the 90° TGB shaft on A119 helicopters. Further analysis identified a specific batch of parts that may be susceptible to similar occurrences.

Prompted by this occurrence, and pending further information from the technical investigation, Leonardo issued SB 119-090 (original issue), providing inspection instructions, and EASA issued AD 2018-0156 to require repetitive inspections of affected parts and, depending on findings, replacement of the 90° TGB.

Since that AD was issued, it has been determined that additional parts may be susceptible to similar occurrences. Furthermore, it was observed that it cannot be excluded that some TGB shafts could have been reinstalled on a TGB other than the one on which they were initially installed. Consequently, Leonardo issued a revised SB, expanding the list of affected parts and updating the instructions.

For the reasons stated above, this AD retains the requirements in superseded EASA AD 2018-0156, and expands the population of affected parts.

This AD is still considered an interim action and further AD action may follow.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


FAA Emergency AD 2020-18-20 MDHI 369 Helicopters(external link)

Effective: 28 Oct 2020

Details: MD Helicopters 369 series, 500N and 600N Helicopters, including Kawasaki-Hughes 500 and 500D Helicopters – Main Rotor Blade (MRB) Leading Edge Abrasion Strip

FAA AD 2020-18-20 with effective date 28 October 2020 and a 10 hour TIS initial compliance is applicable to MDHI 369A, 369D, 369E, 369FF, 369H, 369HE, 369HM, 369HS, 500N, 600N helicopters including Kawasaki-Hughes 500 and 500D helicopters fitted with a MRB P/N 500P2100-105, P/N 500P2100-305, P/N 500P2300-505, P/N 369D21120-505, P/N 369D21121-505, or P/N 369D21123-505 with a 1.25 inch chord length nickel abrasion strip (abrasion strip) manufactured, or installed by Helicopter Technology Company, LLC (HTC), or where the manufacturer of the abrasion strip is unknown.

This AD does not apply if the abrasion strip has accumulated 700 or more hours TIS.

This AD is prompted by reports of abrasion strips departing from MRBs in flight. The AD requires a tap inspection of each MRB leading edge abrasion strip. The FAA is issuing this AD to address an unsafe condition on these products.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0199 Cabri G2 helicopters (Correction)(external link)

Effective: 05 Oct 2020

Details: Cabri G2 helicopters, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0199 (Correction) with effective date 5 October 2020 and a compliance of 30 days, or 30 hours TIS, whichever occurs first, is applicable to Cabri G2 helicopters, all S/N.

This EASA AD is re-issued to correct the P/N of the affected part, which is P/N G12-00-200 and not P/N G12-10-200.

The EASA AD is prompted by an overseas occurrence of finding a crack in a rotating scissors fitting during maintenance.

The suspected cause for the cracking is corrosion under residual stress.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the rotating scissors and loss of helicopter control.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Helicopters Guimbal (HG) has issued SB 20-012, Revision A, with detailed initial inspection instructions and HG SB 20-011, Revision B, with repetitive inspection instructions.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0201R1 - GE Aviation Czech - M601/H80 engines(external link)

Effective: 02 Oct 2020

Details: GE Aviation Czech (formerly Walter Engines) M601D, M601D-1, M601D-11, M601D-11NZ, M601E, M601E-11, M601E-11A, M601E-11AS, M601E-11S, M601E-21, M601F, M601F-22, M601F-32, M601FS, M601T, H75-200, H80-100, H80-200 and H85-200 engines, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0201R1 with effective date 2 October 2020 is revised to correct an affected FCU S/N.

Since EASA AD 2020-0202 was issued, it was determined that a FCU S/N was incorrectly specified in the GE Aviation Czech ASB and subsequently also incorrectly quoted in the EASA AD.

GE Aviation Czech has revised the ASB to Revision 1, dated 24 September 2020 to correct the FCU S/N error and the EASA AD revised to amend Appendix 1 in the AD accordingly.

GE Aviation Czech ASB-H75-73-00-00-0038, ASB-H80-73-00-00-0074, ASB-H85-73-00-00-0032, ASB-M601D-73-00-00-0066, ASB-M601E-73-00-00-0097, ASB-M601F-73-00-00-0050 and ASB-M601T-73-00-00-0040 (single document) original issue dated 18 September 2020, and Revision 1 dated 24 September 2020 pertains to the subject of the revised AD.

The AD is prompted by several occurrences of engine power fluctuations reported during ground tests on engines fitted with an affected part. The investigation results determined that one or more rubber cuff sealings of the cage reinforcement inside the main metering valve of the FCU was incorrectly installed, which reduced the cuff ability to properly seal the FCU working pressure. This condition, if not corrected, may result in an engine surge, fluctuations, or loss of engine power, which could result in loss of aircraft control.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).

 

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