Sometimes an aircraft or component has a safety problem that requires all other aircraft of the same type to be checked. To achieve that, the Director issues an airworthiness directive (AD). The CAA issues new and amended ADs monthly, but emergency ADs can be issued at any time.


EASA AD 2020-0138 Flight Controls – Elevator Control Pushrod – Inspection / Replacement(external link)

Effective 03 Jul 2020

Details: Group 1 (powered) gliders are ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III", GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; GROB G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; GROB G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.
Group 2 gliders are GROB G 103 “TWIN II”; and GROB G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders, all S/N, except S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“, which are Group 1 gliders.

EASA AD 2020-0138 with effective date 3 July 2020 is applicable to the following two groups of gliders as defined in the EASA AD:

Group 1 (powered) gliders are ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III", GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; GROB G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; GROB G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

Group 2 gliders are GROB G 103 “TWIN II”; and GROB G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders, all S/N, except S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“, which are Group 1 gliders.
EASA AD 2020-0138 with effective date 3 July 2020 retains the requirements in superseded EASA AD 2020-0121 and expands the AD applicability. After the issue of AD 2020-0121, EASA and the glider manufacturer determined that Grob G 103 “TWIN II” gliders and Grob G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders are also prone to elevator control pushrod corrosion.
These ADs are prompted by an overseas finding of a severely corroded elevator control pushrod during a routine inspection in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR glider. The technical investigation results revealed that water had soaked into the elevator control pushrod, causing the corrosion damage and subsequent considerable weakening of the steel tube pushrod. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the elevator control pushrod and possible loss of control of the glider.


FAA AD 2020-12-10 Bell Tail Rotor Blades(external link)

Effective 16 Jul 2020

Details: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. Model 205A, 205A-1, 205B, 212, 412, 412CF and 412EP helicopters fitted with a tail rotor blade P/N 212-010-750 (all dash numbers), all S/N except S/Ns with a prefix of “BH”; or S/Ns with a prefix of “A” and a number 17061 or larger.

FAA AD 2020-12-10 with effective date 16 July 2020 supersedes FAA AD 2011-12-08 for Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell), Model 205A, 205A-1, 205B, 212, 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters.

AD 2011-12-08 required a one-time inspection of the tail rotor (T/R) blade for corrosion and pitting. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2011-12-08 while excluding certain T/R blades from the applicability. This AD was prompted by new manufacturing and inspection procedures implemented by Bell that correct the unsafe condition on more recently manufactured T/R blades. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.


EASA AD 2020-0121 Flight Controls – Elevator Control Pushrod – Inspection / Replacement(external link)

Effective 08 Jun 2020

Details: ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III" and GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 through to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0121 with effective date 8 June 2020 is applicable to ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III" and GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 through to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

Compliance with the EASA AD is required within the next 25 hours TIS, or 2 months from 8 June 2020 (the effective date of EASA AD 2020-0121).

This AD is prompted by an overseas finding of a severely corroded elevator control pushrod during a routine inspection in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR glider. The technical investigation results revealed that water had soaked into the elevator control pushrod, causing the corrosion damage and subsequent considerable weakening of the steel tube pushrod. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the elevator control pushrod and possible loss of control of the glider. To address this unsafe condition, Fiberglas-Technik R.Lindner GmbH & Co.KG issued a TM/SB and A/I-G09, now at Revision 1, to provide instructions for elevator control pushrod inspection and replacement.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator control pushrod in the vertical fin and, depending on findings, replacement with a serviceable part, as defined in this AD.
The elevator control pushrod in the vertical fin (drawing number 102-4244, 103-4244, 102C-4296, 103C-4794 or 103A-4244/1, as applicable, depending on the glider model) are affected by this AD.


JCAB AD TCD-4753B-2020 Mitsubishi MU-2B and MU-2B-30 series aircraft - AFM amendment(external link)

Effective 10 Jun 2020

Flight into known or forecast icing conditions - AFM Amendment

JCAB AD 4753B-2020 with effective date 10 June 2020 is applicable to Mitsubishi MU-2B and MU-2B-30 series aircraft.

To reduce the risk of icing related incidents, or accidents on affected aircraft due to pilot error, the AFM must be revised to include certain limitations. For further details please refer to the JCAB AD.


Transport Canada AD CF-2020-11 [PDF 185 KB]

Details: Bell Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 429 helicopters, S/N 57001 through 57210, 57212 through 57344, 57346 through 57371, 57374 through 57377 and 57380.

This AD with effective date 30 April 2020 is prompted by Bell receiving reports of incorrectly staked bearings in the directional control bellcrank assembly.

Improperly staked directional control bellcrank bearings could lead to wear or elongation of the bore in the bellcrank which could result in reduced helicopter directional control.

Bell has published Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 429-19-50, Revision B, dated 19 December 2019, (hereafter called “the ASB”), incorporating a one-time inspection of the bearing for proper staking, the necessary rectification and part replacement, if required.

This AD mandates implementation of the ASB requirements.

Effective 30 Apr 2020


EASA AD 2020-0084 Collective Lever Switch Unit - Inspection(external link)

Applicability: MBB-BK117 D-2, all S/N

Background: This AD is prompted by occurrences reported to EASA of finding affected parts with missing retaining rings for the cable cut switch guard pivot.

If both retaining rings are missing, then there is risk that the guard could separate from the cable cut switch and expose the switch, which could result in inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cut function and possible personal injury. The AD requires a one-time inspection of the affected parts and, depending on findings, accomplishment of the applicable corrective action(s).

This AD also introduces requirements for the installation of affected parts.

Effective: 17 Apr 2020


DCA/AL250/60A Rolls-Royce Allison 250 Series Engines [PDF 23 KB]

Applicability: All Rolls-Royce Allison 250 series engines.

Background: A recent audit has determined that compressor module inspections and repairs may not have been carried out at overhaul in accordance with approved Rolls-Royce procedures.

This AD revised to add additional affected compressor module serial numbers and clarify the AD requirements.

Effective: 19 March 2020


EASA AD 2020-0062-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive - Tail Rotor - Hub - Blade Assembly - Replacement [PDF 570 KB]

AB212, AB412 and AB412EP helicopters, all S/N - effective 19 Mar 2020

Compliance with this AD is required within the next 5 hours TIS from 19 March 2020.

The AD is prompted by an occurrence reported to EASA of finding a surface defect on a tail rotor blade.  Investigation results determined that this defect may have been introduced during manufacturing and a batch of tail rotor blades have been identified which may have a similar defect.  This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of a tail rotor blade and possible reduced helicopter control.  To address this potential unsafe condition, Leonardo issued an ASB to provide inspection instructions for affected blades.  This AD requires replacement of each affected assembly with a serviceable assembly.


FAA AD 2020-05-11 Robinson R44 and R44 II helicopters fitted with an agricultural spray system installed by STC SR00286BO with spray systems S/N 0045 through to 0178 inclusive(external link)

This spray system is also known as a Simplex Manufacturing Company (Simplex) Model 244 spray system. The AD is prompted by a report of an in-flight failure of the spray system elbow pump fitting (pump fitting). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the spray system pump fitting, corrective action if necessary, replacement of the spray system pump fitting and installation of hose supports and a pump outlet cover. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Effective 16 Apr 2020


EASA Emergency AD 2020-0048 Leonardo AW169 helicopters, all S/N - effective 20 March 2020(external link)

EASA AD 2020-0048 with effective date 20 March 2020 is applicable to Leonardo AW169 helicopters, all S/N. This AD supersedes EASA AD 2019-0193.

Since the issue of AD 2019-0193, Leonardo developed an improved TRA P/N 6F6730V00332, introducing a control rod and related castellated nut on the back-end side with left-hand thread.

Leonardo subsequently issued a modification SB to provide instructions for installation of the improved TRA and concurrently revised the applicable inspection ASB.

For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of superseded EASA AD 2019-0193 and requires the installation of the improved TRA. This AD no longer requires compliance with paragraph (1) for Group 2 helicopters, which have an improved TRA installed.

Finally, this AD also prohibits (re)installation of a TRA P/N 6F6730V00331 on any helicopter. This AD is still considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.


EASA Emergency AD 2019-0294 Agusta A109S and AW109SP helicopters, all S/N - effective 18 Dec 2019 [PDF 504 KB]

This AD supersedes EASA AD 2014-0150. It is prompted by findings during scheduled inspections on A109S and AW109SP helicopters. Cracks and damage were detected on the vertical fin vibration absorber installation and the surrounding structure. Investigation results determined that the safety concern is likely related to the design and possible incorrect installation of the vertical fin vibration absorber.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could affect the structural integrity of the helicopter.

To address this unsafe condition, AgustaWestland issued an applicable BT to provide inspection and removal instructions. EASA issued AD 2014-0150 to mandate repetitive inspections and removal of the affected part for Group 1 helicopters as defined in this AD.

Since EASA AD 2014-0150 was issued, it has been determined that an affected part may have been installed in production on additional helicopters, not included in the AD applicability.

EASA AD 2019-0294 retains the requirements of superseded EASA AD 2014-0150 and expands the AD applicability. This AD also prohibits further (re)installation of an affected part on any helicopter.


EASA Emergency AD 2019-0280 Airbus Helicopters AS 350 BB helicopters, all S/N - effective 03 Dec 2019(external link)

The AD is prompted by a recent investigation which determined that the Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS) for the model AS 350 BB helicopter did not include a life limit or a repetitive inspection requirement for the affected part.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in an extended in-service use, consequent failure of an affected part and loss of aircraft control.

Prompted by this finding, Airbus Helicopters issued AS 350 Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 05.00.97, which introduces a Service Life Limit (SLL) and appropriate mandatory inspections for the affected part when installed on the AS 350 BB.

This AD mandates the implementation of the SLL, the repetitive inspections and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).


EASA AD 2019-0272-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive - Tail Rotor Hub Body - Inspection [PDF 573 KB]

EC 120 B helicopters, all serial numbers - effective 01 Nov 2019

The initial inspection of the tail rotor hub body on EC 120 B helicopters mandated by EASA AD 2019-0272-E must be accomplished by an aircraft maintenance engineer.

The repetitive inspection per mandatory action (1) in EASA AD 2019-0272-E, which is required at intervals not to exceed 15 flight hours or 7 days, whichever occurs first, may be accomplished by adding the inspection requirement to the helicopter tech log. The visual inspection may be performed and certified under the provision in Part 43 Appendix A.1 (7) by the holder of a current pilot licence, if that person is rated on the aircraft, appropriately trained and authorised (Part 43, Subpart B refers), and the maintenance is recorded and certified as required by Part 43.

If any cracks are found, then an aircraft engineer must accomplish the corrective actions per the EASA AD 2019-0272-E before further flight.


EASA AD 2019-0266-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive [PDF 497 KB]

ARRIUS 1A and ARRIUS 1A1 engines, all serial numbers (s/n) - effective 29 Oct 2019


UK CAA MPD 2019-006-E - Rotax 912 i series engines and 915 i A series engines [PDF 111 KB]

This UK MPD is applicable to non type-certified Rotax 912 i series and Rotax 915 i A series engine.

Affected engines are fitted with a fuel pump assembly P/N 889696 (part of assembly P/N 889697), or P/N 889698 (part of assembly P/N 889699) with a S/N from 180500 through to 192699 inclusive.


EASA AD 2019-0253-E - Rotax 912 and 915 engines [PDF 500 KB]

Rotax 912 iSc2 Sport, 912 iSc3 Sport and Rotax 915 iSc3 A engines, all S/N fitted with fuel pump assemblies P/N 889696 (part of assembly P/N 889697), or P/N 889698 (part of assembly P/N 889699) with a S/N from 180500 through to 192699 inclusive.

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