Sometimes an aircraft or component has a safety problem that requires all other aircraft of the same type to be checked. To achieve that, the Director issues an airworthiness directive (AD). The CAA issues new and amended ADs monthly, but emergency ADs can be issued at any time.


FAA Emergency AD 2020-18-20 MDHI 369 Helicopters(external link)

Effective: 28 Oct 2020

Details: MD Helicopters 369 series, 500N and 600N Helicopters, including Kawasaki-Hughes 500 and 500D Helicopters – Main Rotor Blade (MRB) Leading Edge Abrasion Strip

FAA AD 2020-18-20 with effective date 28 October 2020 and a 10 hour TIS initial compliance is applicable to MDHI 369A, 369D, 369E, 369FF, 369H, 369HE, 369HM, 369HS, 500N, 600N helicopters including Kawasaki-Hughes 500 and 500D helicopters fitted with a MRB P/N 500P2100-105, P/N 500P2100-305, P/N 500P2300-505, P/N 369D21120-505, P/N 369D21121-505, or P/N 369D21123-505 with a 1.25 inch chord length nickel abrasion strip (abrasion strip) manufactured, or installed by Helicopter Technology Company, LLC (HTC), or where the manufacturer of the abrasion strip is unknown.

This AD does not apply if the abrasion strip has accumulated 700 or more hours TIS.

This AD is prompted by reports of abrasion strips departing from MRBs in flight. The AD requires a tap inspection of each MRB leading edge abrasion strip. The FAA is issuing this AD to address an unsafe condition on these products.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0199 Cabri G2 helicopters (Correction)(external link)

Effective: 05 Oct 2020

Details: Cabri G2 helicopters, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0199 (Correction) with effective date 5 October 2020 and a compliance of 30 days, or 30 hours TIS, whichever occurs first, is applicable to Cabri G2 helicopters, all S/N.

This EASA AD is re-issued to correct the P/N of the affected part, which is P/N G12-00-200 and not P/N G12-10-200.

The EASA AD is prompted by an overseas occurrence of finding a crack in a rotating scissors fitting during maintenance.

The suspected cause for the cracking is corrosion under residual stress.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the rotating scissors and loss of helicopter control.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Helicopters Guimbal (HG) has issued SB 20-012, Revision A, with detailed initial inspection instructions and HG SB 20-011, Revision B, with repetitive inspection instructions.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


EASA AD 2020-0201R1 - GE Aviation Czech - M601/H80 engines(external link)

Effective: 02 Oct 2020

Details: GE Aviation Czech (formerly Walter Engines) M601D, M601D-1, M601D-11, M601D-11NZ, M601E, M601E-11, M601E-11A, M601E-11AS, M601E-11S, M601E-21, M601F, M601F-22, M601F-32, M601FS, M601T, H75-200, H80-100, H80-200 and H85-200 engines, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0201R1 with effective date 2 October 2020 is revised to correct an affected FCU S/N.

Since EASA AD 2020-0202 was issued, it was determined that a FCU S/N was incorrectly specified in the GE Aviation Czech ASB and subsequently also incorrectly quoted in the EASA AD.

GE Aviation Czech has revised the ASB to Revision 1, dated 24 September 2020 to correct the FCU S/N error and the EASA AD revised to amend Appendix 1 in the AD accordingly.

GE Aviation Czech ASB-H75-73-00-00-0038, ASB-H80-73-00-00-0074, ASB-H85-73-00-00-0032, ASB-M601D-73-00-00-0066, ASB-M601E-73-00-00-0097, ASB-M601F-73-00-00-0050 and ASB-M601T-73-00-00-0040 (single document) original issue dated 18 September 2020, and Revision 1 dated 24 September 2020 pertains to the subject of the revised AD.

The AD is prompted by several occurrences of engine power fluctuations reported during ground tests on engines fitted with an affected part. The investigation results determined that one or more rubber cuff sealings of the cage reinforcement inside the main metering valve of the FCU was incorrectly installed, which reduced the cuff ability to properly seal the FCU working pressure. This condition, if not corrected, may result in an engine surge, fluctuations, or loss of engine power, which could result in loss of aircraft control.

The EASA AD can be obtained from the EASA website(external link).


FAA AD 2020-18-51 Attitude and Direction Data System - Bendix King Sandia [PDF 238 KB]

Effective 31 Aug 2020

Details: Sandia Attitude Indicators P/N 306171-10, or P/N 306171-20. These attitude indicators may be marked as Bendix King Model KI-300, or Sandia Model SAI-340A.

FAA Emergency AD 2020-18-51 with New Zealand effective date 31 August 2020 is applicable to Sandia Attitude Indicator P/N 306171-10, or 306171-20.

These attitude indicators may be marked as Bendix King Model KI-300, or Sandia Model SAI-340A.

This AD is prompted by reports of 54 failed attitude indicators with P/N 306171-10, which produced erroneous attitude data to the pilot and the autopilot.

In some instances the pilot is unaware that the data is erroneous or unreliable.  In other instances, where the aircraft is equipped with multiple displays, the pilot may be provided with conflicting information, but will have no way to determine which display contains the correct data.  Attitude indicator P/N 306171-20 is affected by the same unsafe condition because it is identical to P/N 306171-10.

The FAA is issuing this emergency AD to prevent aeronautical decision-making based on erroneous attitude information, which may result in loss of control of the aircraft.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage.(external link)

Note: This FAA AD will be added to the Avionics AD Schedule at the end of September 2020.


FAA AD 2020-18-08 Robinson R44 II helicopters fitted with an orange silicone engine air induction hose P/N A785-31 [PDF 122 KB]

Effective 29 Aug 2020

Details: Robinson R44 II helicopters fitted with an orange silicone engine air induction hose P/N A785-31.

FAA AD 2020-18-08 with New Zealand effective date 29 August 2020 is applicable to Robinson R44 II helicopters fitted with an orange silicone engine air induction hose P/N A785-31.

This AD supersedes FAA AD 2019-12-18 which required inspections of certain engine air induction hoses (hoses) and the replacement of any defective hoses.  AD 2019-12-18 also prohibited the installation of certain hoses.

FAA AD 2020-18-08 continues to require inspections of previously affected hoses, amends the applicability, clarifies the inspection requirements, adds a requirement for repeat inspections, and expands the installation prohibition.

The AD is prompted by an additional report of separation between the outer and inner hose layers and to prevent blockage of air flow to the engine, engine stoppage and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage(external link).


FAA AD 2020-16-06 Aviat A-1, A-1A, A-1B, A-1C-180 and A-1C-200 Aircraft – Forward Horizontal Stabiliser Support [PDF 121 KB] 

Effective 1 Sep 2020

Details: FAA AD 2020-16-06 with effective date 1 September 2020 is applicable to Aviat Husky A-1, A-1A, A-1B, A-1C-180 and A-1C-200 aircraft, all S/N.

This AD is prompted by reports of complete failure of the forward horizontal stabiliser support assembly due to fatigue in combination with complete failure of the rear horizontal stabiliser support tube due to fatigue.

The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent cracking in the forward and rear inboard supports, which could result in failure of the stabiliser supports, detachment of the stabiliser and loss of aircraft control.

The FAA AD can be obtained from the FAA AD webpage(external link).


FAA AD 2020-16-08 Flight Environment Data, Attitude and Direction Data System - Aspen Avionics Inc. [PDF 123 KB]

Effective 17 Aug 2020

Details: FAA AD 2020-16-08 with effective date 17 August 2020 is applicable to Aspen Avionics, Inc., Evolution Flight Display (EFD) EFD1000 Primary Flight Display P/N 910-00001-011, EFD1000 Multi-Function Display P/N 910-00001-012, and EFD1000 Emergency Backup Display P/N 910-00001-017 units that meet both conditions below:

Software version 2.10 or 2.10.1 is installed; and
Independent attitude, altitude, and airspeed back-up instruments are not installed.

These flight display units may be installed on, but are not limited to various small aircraft types/models listed in FAA AD 2020-16-08.


 

EASA AD 2020-0151-E Arriel 1B, 1C, 1C2 and 1D1 engines, all S/N(external link)

Effective 11 Jul 2020

Details: These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter, Eurocopter France, Aerospatiale) AS 350 B, BA, BB, B1 and B2, AS 365 and SA 365 (all models, except AS 365 N3) helicopters.

EASA AD 2020-0151-E with a NZ effective date 11 July 2020 is applicable to ARRIEL 1B, 1C, 1C2 and 1D1 engines, all S/N.

These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter, Eurocopter France, Aerospatiale) AS 350 B, BA, BB, B1 and B2, AS 365 and SA 365 (all models, except AS 365 N3) helicopters.

This AD is prompted by the detection of positive segregation (freckles) on Stage 2 HP turbine discs manufactured from a certain block of material. Other parts manufactured from the same block of material may also be affected by this non-conformity.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in HP turbine disc failure, possible release of high-energy debris with subsequent damage to the aircraft and/or reduced aircraft control. To address this unsafe condition, SAFRAN issued MSB 292 72 0860 original issue, dated 08 July 2020 to identify affected HP turbine discs and provide instructions for replacement. This AD requires replacement of affected parts with serviceable parts and prohibits re-installation of affected parts.

Parts affected by this AD are Stage 2 HP turbine discs P/N 0292250400 with S/N J915AD, J918AD, J919AD, J921AD, J923AD, J924AD, J926AD or J927AD. Affected parts are installed on engines which have SAFRAN modification (mod) TU347 embodied, but do not have mod TU365 embodied.


EASA AD 2020-0138 Flight Controls – Elevator Control Pushrod – Inspection / Replacement(external link)

Effective 03 Jul 2020

Details: Group 1 (powered) gliders are ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III", GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; GROB G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; GROB G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.
Group 2 gliders are GROB G 103 “TWIN II”; and GROB G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders, all S/N, except S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“, which are Group 1 gliders.

EASA AD 2020-0138 with effective date 3 July 2020 is applicable to the following two groups of gliders as defined in the EASA AD:

Group 1 (powered) gliders are ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III", GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; GROB G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; GROB G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

Group 2 gliders are GROB G 103 “TWIN II”; and GROB G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders, all S/N, except S/N 3544 to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“, which are Group 1 gliders.
EASA AD 2020-0138 with effective date 3 July 2020 retains the requirements in superseded EASA AD 2020-0121 and expands the AD applicability. After the issue of AD 2020-0121, EASA and the glider manufacturer determined that Grob G 103 “TWIN II” gliders and Grob G 103 A “TWIN II ACRO” gliders are also prone to elevator control pushrod corrosion.
These ADs are prompted by an overseas finding of a severely corroded elevator control pushrod during a routine inspection in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR glider. The technical investigation results revealed that water had soaked into the elevator control pushrod, causing the corrosion damage and subsequent considerable weakening of the steel tube pushrod. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the elevator control pushrod and possible loss of control of the glider.


FAA AD 2020-12-10 Bell Tail Rotor Blades(external link)

Effective 16 Jul 2020

Details: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. Model 205A, 205A-1, 205B, 212, 412, 412CF and 412EP helicopters fitted with a tail rotor blade P/N 212-010-750 (all dash numbers), all S/N except S/Ns with a prefix of “BH”; or S/Ns with a prefix of “A” and a number 17061 or larger.

FAA AD 2020-12-10 with effective date 16 July 2020 supersedes FAA AD 2011-12-08 for Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell), Model 205A, 205A-1, 205B, 212, 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters.

AD 2011-12-08 required a one-time inspection of the tail rotor (T/R) blade for corrosion and pitting. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2011-12-08 while excluding certain T/R blades from the applicability. This AD was prompted by new manufacturing and inspection procedures implemented by Bell that correct the unsafe condition on more recently manufactured T/R blades. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.


EASA AD 2020-0121 Flight Controls – Elevator Control Pushrod – Inspection / Replacement(external link)

Effective 08 Jun 2020

Details: ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III" and GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 through to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

EASA AD 2020-0121 with effective date 8 June 2020 is applicable to ASTIR CS, ASTIR CS 77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR, TWIN ASTIR TRAINER, GROB G 103 C "TWIN III" and GROB G 103 C "TWIN III ACRO" gliders, all S/N; G 103 C TWIN III SL powered gliders, all S/N; G 103 A "TWIN II ACRO" gliders, S/N 3544 through to 3878 inclusive, with letter „K“; and ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS TOP, ASTIR CS TOP powered gliders, all S/N.

Compliance with the EASA AD is required within the next 25 hours TIS, or 2 months from 8 June 2020 (the effective date of EASA AD 2020-0121).

This AD is prompted by an overseas finding of a severely corroded elevator control pushrod during a routine inspection in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR glider. The technical investigation results revealed that water had soaked into the elevator control pushrod, causing the corrosion damage and subsequent considerable weakening of the steel tube pushrod. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the elevator control pushrod and possible loss of control of the glider. To address this unsafe condition, Fiberglas-Technik R.Lindner GmbH & Co.KG issued a TM/SB and A/I-G09, now at Revision 1, to provide instructions for elevator control pushrod inspection and replacement.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator control pushrod in the vertical fin and, depending on findings, replacement with a serviceable part, as defined in this AD.
The elevator control pushrod in the vertical fin (drawing number 102-4244, 103-4244, 102C-4296, 103C-4794 or 103A-4244/1, as applicable, depending on the glider model) are affected by this AD.


JCAB AD TCD-4753B-2020 Mitsubishi MU-2B and MU-2B-30 series aircraft - AFM amendment(external link)

Effective 10 Jun 2020

Flight into known or forecast icing conditions - AFM Amendment

JCAB AD 4753B-2020 with effective date 10 June 2020 is applicable to Mitsubishi MU-2B and MU-2B-30 series aircraft.

To reduce the risk of icing related incidents, or accidents on affected aircraft due to pilot error, the AFM must be revised to include certain limitations. For further details please refer to the JCAB AD.


Transport Canada AD CF-2020-11 [PDF 185 KB]

Details: Bell Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 429 helicopters, S/N 57001 through 57210, 57212 through 57344, 57346 through 57371, 57374 through 57377 and 57380.

This AD with effective date 30 April 2020 is prompted by Bell receiving reports of incorrectly staked bearings in the directional control bellcrank assembly.

Improperly staked directional control bellcrank bearings could lead to wear or elongation of the bore in the bellcrank which could result in reduced helicopter directional control.

Bell has published Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 429-19-50, Revision B, dated 19 December 2019, (hereafter called “the ASB”), incorporating a one-time inspection of the bearing for proper staking, the necessary rectification and part replacement, if required.

This AD mandates implementation of the ASB requirements.

Effective 30 Apr 2020


EASA AD 2020-0084 Collective Lever Switch Unit - Inspection(external link)

Applicability: MBB-BK117 D-2, all S/N

Background: This AD is prompted by occurrences reported to EASA of finding affected parts with missing retaining rings for the cable cut switch guard pivot.

If both retaining rings are missing, then there is risk that the guard could separate from the cable cut switch and expose the switch, which could result in inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cut function and possible personal injury. The AD requires a one-time inspection of the affected parts and, depending on findings, accomplishment of the applicable corrective action(s).

This AD also introduces requirements for the installation of affected parts.

Effective: 17 Apr 2020


DCA/AL250/60A Rolls-Royce Allison 250 Series Engines [PDF 23 KB]

Applicability: All Rolls-Royce Allison 250 series engines.

Background: A recent audit has determined that compressor module inspections and repairs may not have been carried out at overhaul in accordance with approved Rolls-Royce procedures.

This AD revised to add additional affected compressor module serial numbers and clarify the AD requirements.

Effective: 19 March 2020


EASA AD 2020-0062-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive - Tail Rotor - Hub - Blade Assembly - Replacement [PDF 570 KB]

AB212, AB412 and AB412EP helicopters, all S/N - effective 19 Mar 2020

Compliance with this AD is required within the next 5 hours TIS from 19 March 2020.

The AD is prompted by an occurrence reported to EASA of finding a surface defect on a tail rotor blade.  Investigation results determined that this defect may have been introduced during manufacturing and a batch of tail rotor blades have been identified which may have a similar defect.  This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in failure of a tail rotor blade and possible reduced helicopter control.  To address this potential unsafe condition, Leonardo issued an ASB to provide inspection instructions for affected blades.  This AD requires replacement of each affected assembly with a serviceable assembly.


FAA AD 2020-05-11 Robinson R44 and R44 II helicopters fitted with an agricultural spray system installed by STC SR00286BO with spray systems S/N 0045 through to 0178 inclusive(external link)

This spray system is also known as a Simplex Manufacturing Company (Simplex) Model 244 spray system. The AD is prompted by a report of an in-flight failure of the spray system elbow pump fitting (pump fitting). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the spray system pump fitting, corrective action if necessary, replacement of the spray system pump fitting and installation of hose supports and a pump outlet cover. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Effective 16 Apr 2020


EASA Emergency AD 2020-0048 Leonardo AW169 helicopters, all S/N - effective 20 March 2020(external link)

EASA AD 2020-0048 with effective date 20 March 2020 is applicable to Leonardo AW169 helicopters, all S/N. This AD supersedes EASA AD 2019-0193.

Since the issue of AD 2019-0193, Leonardo developed an improved TRA P/N 6F6730V00332, introducing a control rod and related castellated nut on the back-end side with left-hand thread.

Leonardo subsequently issued a modification SB to provide instructions for installation of the improved TRA and concurrently revised the applicable inspection ASB.

For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of superseded EASA AD 2019-0193 and requires the installation of the improved TRA. This AD no longer requires compliance with paragraph (1) for Group 2 helicopters, which have an improved TRA installed.

Finally, this AD also prohibits (re)installation of a TRA P/N 6F6730V00331 on any helicopter. This AD is still considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.


EASA Emergency AD 2019-0294 Agusta A109S and AW109SP helicopters, all S/N - effective 18 Dec 2019 [PDF 504 KB]

This AD supersedes EASA AD 2014-0150. It is prompted by findings during scheduled inspections on A109S and AW109SP helicopters. Cracks and damage were detected on the vertical fin vibration absorber installation and the surrounding structure. Investigation results determined that the safety concern is likely related to the design and possible incorrect installation of the vertical fin vibration absorber.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could affect the structural integrity of the helicopter.

To address this unsafe condition, AgustaWestland issued an applicable BT to provide inspection and removal instructions. EASA issued AD 2014-0150 to mandate repetitive inspections and removal of the affected part for Group 1 helicopters as defined in this AD.

Since EASA AD 2014-0150 was issued, it has been determined that an affected part may have been installed in production on additional helicopters, not included in the AD applicability.

EASA AD 2019-0294 retains the requirements of superseded EASA AD 2014-0150 and expands the AD applicability. This AD also prohibits further (re)installation of an affected part on any helicopter.


EASA Emergency AD 2019-0280 Airbus Helicopters AS 350 BB helicopters, all S/N - effective 03 Dec 2019(external link)

The AD is prompted by a recent investigation which determined that the Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS) for the model AS 350 BB helicopter did not include a life limit or a repetitive inspection requirement for the affected part.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in an extended in-service use, consequent failure of an affected part and loss of aircraft control.

Prompted by this finding, Airbus Helicopters issued AS 350 Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 05.00.97, which introduces a Service Life Limit (SLL) and appropriate mandatory inspections for the affected part when installed on the AS 350 BB.

This AD mandates the implementation of the SLL, the repetitive inspections and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).


EASA AD 2019-0272-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive - Tail Rotor Hub Body - Inspection [PDF 573 KB]

EC 120 B helicopters, all serial numbers - effective 01 Nov 2019

The initial inspection of the tail rotor hub body on EC 120 B helicopters mandated by EASA AD 2019-0272-E must be accomplished by an aircraft maintenance engineer.

The repetitive inspection per mandatory action (1) in EASA AD 2019-0272-E, which is required at intervals not to exceed 15 flight hours or 7 days, whichever occurs first, may be accomplished by adding the inspection requirement to the helicopter tech log. The visual inspection may be performed and certified under the provision in Part 43 Appendix A.1 (7) by the holder of a current pilot licence, if that person is rated on the aircraft, appropriately trained and authorised (Part 43, Subpart B refers), and the maintenance is recorded and certified as required by Part 43.

If any cracks are found, then an aircraft engineer must accomplish the corrective actions per the EASA AD 2019-0272-E before further flight.


EASA AD 2019-0266-E - Emergency Airworthiness Directive [PDF 497 KB]

ARRIUS 1A and ARRIUS 1A1 engines, all serial numbers (s/n) - effective 29 Oct 2019


UK CAA MPD 2019-006-E - Rotax 912 i series engines and 915 i A series engines [PDF 111 KB]

This UK MPD is applicable to non type-certified Rotax 912 i series and Rotax 915 i A series engine.

Affected engines are fitted with a fuel pump assembly P/N 889696 (part of assembly P/N 889697), or P/N 889698 (part of assembly P/N 889699) with a S/N from 180500 through to 192699 inclusive.


EASA AD 2019-0253-E - Rotax 912 and 915 engines [PDF 500 KB]

Rotax 912 iSc2 Sport, 912 iSc3 Sport and Rotax 915 iSc3 A engines, all S/N fitted with fuel pump assemblies P/N 889696 (part of assembly P/N 889697), or P/N 889698 (part of assembly P/N 889699) with a S/N from 180500 through to 192699 inclusive.

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