Research and development organisation certification

Part 107 requires that Research and Development organisations have a hazard register in which they:

• assess their operation’s hazards and associated risks
• assess risks, and
• propose risk mitigations. 

While Part 107 describes the outcome, the operator is responsible for deciding the best way to achieve the outcome and outlining how it will be achieved in their exposition.

This gives operators more flexibility to develop a risk management plan that best manages the risks associated with what they are trying to accomplish.

To do so, operators must:

• understand their operation well enough to identify hazards and risks and develop a robust and ongoing risk management plan, and
• be able to explain to CAA how this plan will work in practice. 

CAA will assess whether the applicant has adequately identified the hazards and risks associated with their operation and developed the necessary controls, processes and procedures to manage risks appropriately.

When considering a Part 107 application, CAA inspectors want to ensure applicants are aware of hazards and risks not just to their own operation, but also to other airspace users and to people and property on the ground. Demonstrating an understanding of the latter risks will help operators show CAA that they appreciate their responsibilities as part of the wider aviation system.

Part 107 operators need a good understanding of the context in which they will be conducting research and development and be able to describe that context within their exposition to inform the scope of considerations for the hazard register. This includes:

•  the size and complexity of the research and development operation
• whether the operator has experience with this type of operation
• social and environmental factors which may impact the operation, for example:
  • relevant local regulations, such as regional plans
  • any challenging aspects of local geography or weather
  • whether the locations are urban or rural, and
  • whether the local community supports the operation. 

When developing their hazard register, Part 107 operators need to consider:

• the inherent reliability of the systems involved
• the likelihood of a failure and the associated hazards
• how these hazards influence the requirements of the location and airspace
• how access to the location and airspace will be managed,
• any external factors that may impact the operation, such as atmospheric interference with communication or navigation systems, and
• the potential for the operation to generate disruption or interference outside of the location or airspace, such as laser, radio and radar emissions. 

When discussing hazards and risks, CAA has chosen to use elements of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) semantic model to standardise terminology for key phases of operation, procedures, and operational volumes.

SORA is a specialised risk assessment process for Uncrewed Aircraft (UA) activities. JARUS developed the SORA model as a risk assessment methodology to analyse and assess the ground and air risks of a proposed UA operation and establish confidence it can be conducted with an acceptable level of risk.

While CAA considers the SORA methodology an acceptable means of compliance as a risk assessment method for high-complexity operations, not everyone applying for a Part 107 certificate needs to use SORA when developing a hazard register. More information about SORA is freely available on the JARUS website(external link).

Terminology

Operational volume is the airspace and ground area where the operation is intended to take place safely. It includes the flight geography and the contingency volume. 

Flight geography is the area where all normal operations are planned to occur. 

Contingency volume is the airspace and ground area surrounding the flight geography. Entry into the contingency volume is always considered an abnormal situation.

Hazards can be identified through many sources, including in-house safety reporting systems, inspections, audits, and information sharing. External sources of information could include professional research, industry publications, and published accident and incident data.

Reactive (or research-based) analysis involves research about events, serious incidents or accidents that have already happened, particularly in operations with similar scope and technology. This involves analysis of past outcomes or events. Hazards are identified through investigations of safety occurrences, incidents or events, or quality audits, in the operator’s organisation. Incidents and accidents are an indication of system deficiencies, so can be used to determine which hazard(s) contributed to the event. Sharing safety-critical data can mean that an event in one operation or part of an organisation, can become a learning opportunity for others.

Proactive analysis highlights potential hazards in the operation’s environment, technology, activities and processes. It is especially applicable to new or changing parts of the operation, or very innovative operations. This involves collecting safety data of lower-consequence events or process performance, often from safety reporting systems or audits to help operators determine if a hazard could lead to an accident or incident. Proactive hazard identification can also be achieved through systematic reviews of operational processes and procedures as well as during planning for change that the operation may be considering.

Examples of hazard considerations when planning for Part 107 operations include ground risk considerations and air risk considerations (see below).

Population locations and variations

Consider the location of the operational volume and its relationship to where people live, work and gather, such as residential areas, commercial districts, and public facilities like schools or hospitals.

The number of people at a location might change throughout the day, week, or even year. For example, a downtown area might be very densely populated during business hours but empty at night, while a park or playground might be the opposite.

Access management

Consider how do people who are not associated with the operation access the operational volume. This could include publicly accessible areas such as parks and beaches, and more controlled environments such as a private farm, or an industrial site with managed access.

Also consider safely managing access for people who are associated with the operation.

Vehicle traffic

Consider how activities conducted within the operational volume may create a hazard to vehicles and their occupants on public and private roads. Could the activity create a distraction to road users?

Infrastructure

Is there significant infrastructure in the operational volume which could be affected by an incident, such as power lines or wireless communication antennas? What is the potential for a cascading failure or a significant disruption for the services which are provided by that infrastructure?

Airspace users

Consider the different types of airspace users and the associated aviation activity which may be occurring in and around the operational volume. These could include:

• private or commercial powered aircraft and helicopters
• agricultural aircraft operations
• sport flying activity such as gliding, hang-gliding, or paragliding, and
• recreational activity such as model aircraft, model rocketry and drone flying. 

The frequency and type of airspace activity might change throughout the day, week, or even year. For example, a commercial flight school may be more active during a normal work week, and a recreational flying club may be more active on weekends.

How will other airspace users know where the operational volume is and when the research and development operation is occurring?

What are the hazards if:

• the planned operation leaves the flight geography or operational volume, or
• another airspace user enters the operating volume when it is active? 

Airspace classification

Consider the type of airspace in and around the operational volume. This airspace may be controlled or uncontrolled and may also have areas which are categorised as special use airspace (SUA). How will these airspace structures and procedures influence the behaviour of other airspace users?

Aerodromes and heliports

Consider the relative distance and direction of aerodromes and heliports from the flight geography. This may include aerodromes not marked on aviation charts, such as private airstrips or airstrips on local farms for agricultural operations. Are there any visual flight procedures, instrument flight procedures, or air navigation routes in the vicinity of the operational volume?

Weather conditions

Consider how the local climate and weather patterns such as wind speed, wind direction, turbulence, cloud base and visibility could affect the ability to conduct research and development operations safely. Weather conditions may also change the flight path and altitude of other airspace users. For example, a change in wind direction may result in a change of runway or flight paths at a nearby aerodrome.